

University Extension Lectures

UNIVERSITY OF RAJPUTANA

INDIA'S CULTURE AND HER PROBLEMS



by

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To
My MOTHER.

INDIA'S CULTURE AND HER PROBLEMS:

Introduction.

The following four lectures were delivered at the Maharaja's College, Jaipur, under the scheme of the University Extension Lectures of the University of Rajputana, and retain their original form. The author was at first asked to write a paper on the subject for the Unesco; and he expanded the ideas of that paper into these lectures.

In the West, cultural and religious factors ceased for a time to be so important causes of conflict as political ideologies, though in totalitarian states politics is determining the form of culture and so culture has again become a cause of conflict. But in India and the Near East, religion and culture are still direct causes of conflict. Many of the educated Indians, particularly among the Hindus, are reluctant to make this admission and a few seem to be ashamed of doing so. One reason given by them is that, if we make this admission, we have to discuss it, a procedure which would hurt the feelings of this or that community. But if our aim is to remove the conflicts, we have to understand their causes, and for that purpose again we have to know the latter as they are. Whether the problem is that of social or physical science, our attitude to it should be impersonal and objective. To speak the truth may hurt the feelings of some. When Galileo spoke the truth about the earth's movement, the feelings of the Christian fathers were really hurt; but in course of time they appreciated what he said, for truth cannot be suppressed and falsity vindicated for ever. Progress of science would not have been possible, if the sentiments of the Christian fathers had had to receive everlasting respect: So also no social and political progress would be possible if the sentiments of some uncompromising traditionalists and fanatics were to be the guide. The prosperity and welfare of society is far more important than the sentiments of traditionalists.

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Indeed, one need not be blind to the importance of tradition as a conservative force for society. But traditions have their roots in the historical and geographical conditions of some remote past and could not always have been started with an eye to their unknown future. So if the future declares some traditions to be unsuitable, it means no disrespect to the formulators of those traditions. Similarly, if the future discovers some foundations of those traditions to be false superstitions, it is equally not disrespectful to their formulators. Einstein showed no disrespect to Newton when he discovered that some of the latter's hypotheses were not adequate. Progress is possible when we discover the truth, speak freely about it, and act accordingly. If progress is desired, facts as such should be grasped and discussed.

The attitude of hesitancy to face facts and recognize the problems cannot therefore be called healthy. The author himself was adopting this attitude; but it was Unesco's invitation to write frankly that made him speak out. Even if a problem is found to be unsolvable, it is better to understand it objectively than to ignore it. But really no human problem should be insoluble, if we have the will to solve it and if the people concerned co-operate with each other to find out a solution. Pride and prejudice are the greatest obstacles in the way. It is given to children, the academic circles and saints to speak out the truth, however unpalatable it may be to many, to raise problems, and to ask for and suggest answers.

When the author speaks of some aspects of Hinduism, Islam and Christianity, he wishes neither to praise them nor to condemn them. He speaks only of their effects on our cultural ideal. He wishes to make only a factual representation. No religion contains everything good or everything evil. Cultural conflicts are due to eschewable factors being uncompromisingly treated as sacrosanct and uneschewable. If we have the courage to give up or transform them by following reason, conflicts

would be avoided and progress would be made possible. But if a single community shows reluctance to adopt this course, the reaction of other communities also would be rendered undesirable. Cultural progress is a co operative enterprise, in which the groups concerned should work with the spirit not only of 'give and take' but also of 'give up and take up'.

In these lectures the term 'Indian culture' is used in an undefined sense. Originally Indian culture must be the culture of the pre-Dravidian aboriginals of India. Later, it includes that of the Dravidians, afterwards of the Aryans, then of Islam, and finally of the West. In its present phase, the conflicting elements of the culture of the country have not been transformed as yet, and proper integration has not yet been achieved.

It is the practice of some writers to equate Indian culture to Hindu culture, and treat Islamic and Christian cultures as different. Some regard even Buddhist culture as different from the Hindu, though there is less justification for doing so, as originally Buddhism was part of the Arya Dharma, which later on acquired the name Hinduism. The author therefore found it advisable not to give a kind of *a priori* definition to start with. Early Brahmanic culture cannot be said to be inherently opposed to the Buddhist, because the basic factors of Buddhist culture are traceable to the Brahmanas and Upanishads. Hindu culture, as it is called, took a definite form after the rise and spread of Buddhism. It was this Hindu culture that entered into serious conflict with Islam. After the advent of Islam, Indian culture would include the Islamic, though many Muslims may not like it to be so treated. The West came into contact with Indian culture only as including the Islamic. At present, Indian culture includes the Christian and Western scientific culture also. And the problem for India now is as to how to bring about a true integration of these factors, which have been allowed to remain without being properly assimilated to each other.

These lectures do not deal with all of India's problems; nor do they deal with all her problems that are directly and indirectly created by her culture, but only with some of them that are primary from the human and social point of view. Culture is the inner mental side of civilization and is expressed in the several forms of mythology, art, social and political structure, religion, science, and philosophy. It is impossible to treat all these forms or even to do justice to any one of them within the scope of these lectures, which were meant for general audiences. The lecturer's aim was to present the broad philosophical aspects of our culture and some important problems it has created. A bird's eye view of our cultural development is given as a historical perspective, in which of course no attempt could be made to establish the truth of dates and facts.

The author takes this opportunity to thank the University of Rajputana not only for inviting him to deliver these lectures but also for printing and publishing them.

P. T. RAJU.

INDIA'S CULTURE AND HER PROBLEMS.*

LECTURE I.

The Formative Period of Indian Culture.

There is justification for saying that India has become the battle ground of East and West, provided we continue using the words in the sense of oriental and occidental cultures. For the term, East-West conflict, has come to refer to the conflict within Europe itself, the culture of which has been traditionally called West. However, what is peculiarly East, the life of the inner spirit, was and has been the most conspicuous characteristic of Indian culture even after the advent of the British, after which West has made powerful inroads. There are observers, like Dickenson¹, who think that India alone is representative of East and that China and Japan have much in common with West. Even if we do not go the whole length with them in this opinion, we shall not at all be wrong if we say that India is especially representative of East; for so far as religion, in the sense of the life of the inner spirit, is concerned, it is India that supplied it mostly to China and Japan. Even Christianity owes its ideas of deeper spiritual life to India. Two of the most important works of early Christian mysticism, *The Cloud of Unknowing* and *Barlham and Jewassef*, the concepts of which are eloquently explained by Huxley in his *Grey Eminence*,² are Christian versions of the life and philosophy of Buddha. And Mohemmad derived his spiritual ideas from the atmosphere of mixed Christianity and Buddhism.

But the penetration of West into India has not brought about any convulsion. India's revolutions, as Fisher aptly puts it,³ are silent. This observation holds true not only in the

* These four lectures incorporate the contents of the author's *Education on the same subject* in 1943, and

them 1. *Civilization*

lectures 'West' :

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understood, 1

Religion and Western Thought. Chaps. V and VI. 3. *India's Silent*

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To understand or evaluate Indian culture, a bird's eye view of its history would be useful. Culture is generally represented in religion, philosophy, arts, literature, and social and political life. But as the primitive man regards all his activities as parts of his religion, all ancient cultures give religious colouring to their expressions. Indian culture was no exception.

Somehow, without the least intention on the part of the Indians themselves, Indian religion has come to be called Hinduism or Hindu religion. But in none of the ancient Sanscrit works themselves do we find the word Hindu. The Vedic sages called their religion Vedic Dharma (the Law or Path of the Vedas) and also Arya Dharma (the Law or Path of the Aryans). Even Buddha and Mahavira called their religions Arya Dharmas. Further, Hinduism defies definition. It is not a revealed religion and is not expounded by a single individual. It is the result of a natural spiritual development of man, the outcome of the cumulative spiritual quest of humanity, retaining in the result all the imperfect stages of its growth, not however in their original meaningless crudity, but as steps or pointers to deeper spiritual realization. That is why Hinduism presents to the outsider a vast array of the most incongruous forms of worship from that of stone and wood to the mental worship of the spirit within. No wonder it can accommodate every new cult—which is irritating to those who wish to retain their religious particularism.

Hindu religion was so called by the early Persians, who pronounced the word Sind as Hind. Hind for them was the land of the river Indus or Sindhu; its people were called Hindus. The Europeans call the religion Hinduism. Now that it has been in existence for several centuries, may we not attempt a definition? Bearing in mind that Hinduism does not possess any set of dogmas or formulas enunciated by a person or council, we may say that it stands for the belief that "God or Ultimate

sphere of her religion but also happily in that of her politics, of which Mahatma Gandhi's work is an outstanding example. It is India's genius to bring about revolutions silently, peacefully and without bloodshed, provided she is allowed to do things in her own way. In arts, literature, politics and social organization, she is introducing western scientific ideas slowly and steadily, without fear of losing her soul in the process. Her culture reached a depth of view-point, whence she is not afraid of rational reforms.

India is a fitting example for study for organizations like the Unesco, which are interested in understanding cultural conflicts and syntheses. In no other country in the world have so many races and cultures met as in India. It is usual to speak of America as the melting pot; but it has not been a melting pot of so many races as India. America's colour problem has not yet been solved. If at all, it is only the European races that have melted together in the new continent. But in India, almost all the races of the world met long before the advent of Islam; but they developed a peculiarly integrated culture, the depths of which have never been surpassed, whatever inadequacies it may disclose in some of its workings.

One important point we should remember is that East and West no longer coincide with the geographical divisions. Western science and humanism have taken root in countries of the East, particularly India, China and Japan. And already some of the leading thinkers of the West have begun to realize the value of East for the West, which otherwise is losing even the humanistic values to which it has given primacy. East and West are tending by slow degrees to become hypothetical entities, which, one may expect, will no more be seen with their decisive differences in the near future. So whenever we speak of India, in the present lectures, as the East, it should not be understood that present-day India has nothing of West in her.

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it is difficult to fix the earliest date of this colonization and say how the Hindus effected it. But the history of the Hindu colonization of South East Asia and the East Indies has been traced by the modern historians and archeologists to the 1st century B. C. or A. D. The culture of these countries is definitely Hindu and many are still Buddhist in religion. Even the spread of Islam in the East Indies has not completely wiped out the ancient culture.

The chief architects of Hindu culture and civilization are the Aryans. It is generally believed that both the Aryans and their predecessors, the Dravidians, were immigrants into India. The latter seem to have conquered the original Negrito races and occupied India some twenty thousand years ago. They had a well developed culture of their own. Some think that priesthood and caste system were in existence in India even before the first Aryans set foot on the soil,⁶ who in their turn conquered the Dravidians and established themselves. The Aryans seem to have entered not only through the Khyber Pass but also via Baluchistan, and to be in constant conflict with the Dravidians all along this route right from Iran.⁷ The majority of the scholars believe that the Mohenjo-Daro civilization was pre-Aryan. Its people knew cotton, agriculture, pottery, writing, fine arts like dancing, building of cities, sanitation, metal working and trade. Their government might have been of the republican type. They had a cult of the Mother-goddess or Sakti worship and also Yoga or surrender of one's soul through psychological discipline. They worshipped Siva as Pasupati (Lord of the beasts) and also as a Yogin in meditation. There are indications of the worship of the phallus. It is likely that they worshipped the buffalo as the symbol of destruction, which later became, in Hindu mythology, the *vahana* (carrier) of Yama, the god of death.

⁶ E. F. Orion : *India with the Past Ages*, p. 70. ⁷ The sixth mandala of the Rigveda, according to Hillebrandt, was composed in Arachosia in Iran.

Reality is inward and is our innermost being, and also for a systematized technique and a way of life conducive to the realization of that being⁴." The Hindu has no objection to consider *as true every other religion that recognizes this principle and will even find a place for it within his own fold. That is why Macnicol characterized Hinduism as "omnivorous".*

By a modest estimate we may now assign the beginnings of Indian culture to about 4000 B.C., the time of the Mohenjo-Daro civilization. Some place the beginnings nearer, but the date is not of primary importance for the present purpose. Hindu history must be far older, though unfortunately we do not possess sufficiently recognizable evidence to trace the continuity. The ancient civilizations of the Aztecs in Mexico and of the Incas in South America are, for many reasons, considered to be Hindu. The Puranas, which unfortunately mix up history with mythology, contain identifiable references to the Maya civilization, its religion of Sakti (Maya) worship and human sacrifice and its astronomical system. Observers of South America have brought to our notice several replicas of Hindu gods and goddesses, similarities in the architecture of temples and in social practices. Sir W. Jones says: "Rama is represented as a descendant from the sun, as the husband of Sita, and the son of the princess named Causelya. It is very remarkable that Peruvians, whose Incas boasted of the same descent, styled their greatest festival as Rama Sitya; whence we may suppose that South America was peopled by the same race who imported into the farthest parts of Asia the rites and fabulous history of Rama⁵." Puranic references indicate that not only did the Hindus conquer and colonize these remote places but were constantly coming back to their original home and taking part in wars and battles. But

4. Vide the author's presidential address to the Section of Philosophy and Religion at The All-India Oriental Conference 1943. Published in *The Vedanta Kesari*, December 1948.

5. *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. I, p. 426. Quoted in H. D. Sarda's *Hindu Superiority*, p. 153.

towards the end. By that time, the other Vedas also with their Upanishads were composed and the Aryan religion achieved its inwardness. Man began to feel that the light of the self within and of the sun without were identical.⁹ The Upanishads contain ideas of *samsara* or transmigration, the law of *karma*, immortality of the soul, higher and lower knowledge (*para* and *apara vidya*), the supremacy of the Absolute Spirit (Brahman) and its identity with the knowledge of it, along with some formulations of methods of meditation.

By the time of the Upanishads the caste system developed, though it did not crystalize into the later rigid forms. The books written on caste system are legion, some highly extolling it, others depreciating it and attributing everything evil in India to it. But whatever view is taken, as MM P. V. Kane rightly says,¹⁰ the early references to the four castes are only references to a fact, and not to a theory that was to be realised as an ideal. The *Purushasukta* of the Rigveda speaks of the four castes, Brahmana, Kshatriya, Vaisya and Sudra. They are priests, warriors, merchants and agriculturists, and servants and cultivators, both the last castes carrying on agriculture. MacDougall says that all the ancient nations are caste nations.¹¹ As wave after wave of different races and tribes of the same race poured into India as conquerors, they settled down, forming several social strata, which were finally reduced to the four castes. The Sanskrit words used for caste are *varna* (colour), *jati* (birth), and *kula* (family, community or tribe). The caste system in India, we may therefore say, was based upon the three principles. But it does not coincide with any one merely. The word, Sudra, for instance, did not at first denote only men of the non-Aryan race. Ptolemy mentions a tribe Sydroi inhabiting northern Arachosia.¹² It was used for a pre-Aryan tribe also inhabiting

9. *Taittiriya*, III, 10, 4.

10. *History of Dharmashastra*, Vol.

11. Part I, p. 17.

11. *Group Mind*, p. 257.

12. D. R. Pundarikar *Some Aspects of Ancient Indian Culture* p. 10.

From 4000 B. C. to about 2000 B. C., to which are generally assigned the beginnings of the Rigveda, we have no connected history of India. It is not even established beyond doubt as to who destroyed the Mohenjo Daro civilization. It is of interest to us because its achievements are retained and absorbed by Indian culture in its progress. The Rigveda cannot antedate the Aryan immigrations. And we cannot imagine that the Mohenjo-Daro civilization, though uninfused by the Aryan in the beginning, remained what it was in 4000 B. C. even after contact with the latter. The early Aryans were worshippers of natural forces. It is therefore thought that the intensely inward religion of the Upanishads did not originate in them. It is often asked whether the Aryans were Indianized or India was Aryanized⁸. The Aryans of the other countries did not develop a religion of the inner spirit and had no caste system. The question is therefore significant. And whatever be the answer, it has to assume contact and interfusion of different cultures, unless the view that India was the original home of the Aryans is accepted.

Of all the Vedas, the Rigveda is the earliest. No Veda is the work of a single author. Each has four divisions: the Samhitas or the collections of hymns, the Brahmanas dealing with ritual and sacrifice, the Aranyakas or forest treatises, and the Upanishads which are philosophical disquisitions. The earliest portions of the Rigveda Samhita do not show that the Aryans turned their gaze inwards in the attempt to discover the Ultimate Truth. For some time they might have continued the worship of natural forces like the sun, the moon, the stars, the winds, etc., and of the deities supposed to be presiding over these natural forces. The *Bṛhadaranyaka*, which is one of the earliest of the pre-Buddhist Upanishads, is ascribed to 900 B. C. So roughly from about 1500 to 900 B. C. interfusion of the two religions, worship of natural forces and worship of the Inner Spirit, might have continued and their integration might have been completed

8, Sir Charles Elliot: *Hinduism and Buddhism*, Vol. 1, p. XV.

untouchables¹¹ were not deprived of some of their human rights. They were indeed culturally far inferior to the Aryans and the Dravidians of the time, very unclean in their life and habits. But the treatment given to them by the early Aryans of India compares very favourably with that meted out not long ago in the Christian era by some Europeans to the inhabitants of America and Africa. No tribe was forced by threats of extermination to give up their mode of life and religion. The Aryan religion achieved inwardness, in the light of which they interpreted their own past cults; and they endeavoured to confer the same spiritual inwardness upon the cults of the barbarous tribes they conquered, teaching at the same time that the idols they worshipped and the methods of their worship were symbols of the inner spirit and of the processes of its realization. The *Taittiriyaopaniṣad* says that the processes of reality may be interpreted in a five-fold way: *adhilokam* or as natural physical processes, *adhiḥyotiham* or as 'due to gods or deities (the bright ones)', *adhiṣṭiham* or as sacrificial acts, *adhiprajām* or as the creative processes of the sexes, and *adhyātmam* or as the processes of the self. This passage shows that, by the time of the *Taittiriya*, an attempt was made to amalgamate five distinct views of the world and its creation, which were to constitute the philosophical foundation of the religious life of the people. Ultimately, the first four were subordinated to the fifth; we find this subordination practically in every Upaniṣad.¹² Some people were performing sacrifices as in the Mithraic cult; some were worshipping natural forces; some the deities presiding over the forces; some, particularly

11. Untouchability was due not only to belonging to some tribes but also to committing heinous crimes and following cruel and impure professions. See Kane: *History of Dharmasastra*, Vol. II, Part I, p. 169.

12. The *Bhṛataraopaniṣad* and the first part of the *Bṛhadāraṇyako-
paniṣad* are very interesting in this connection. They show that the
Aryans no longer viewed sacrifices as mere propitiations of gods but as
graded processes of self-surrender with cosmic and philosophical signifi-
cance.

the land of the Indus. Further, we have said already that the Dravidians also had a caste system, which, some think, was adopted by the Aryans, as it was the most convenient and peaceful way of incorporating the conquered who were far more numerous, without at the same time giving up the superior status of conquerors. For instance, Ravana, king of Lanka (Ceylon), whom Rama defeated and killed, was a Brahmin; and for killing a Brahmin, who belonged to a higher caste, Rama had to perform *prayaschitta* (atonement, expiation). Again, many Aryan tribes were treated as Sudras, as for instance Sakas (Scythians), Yavanas (Ionians), Pahlavas, and Asuras (Assyrians). Some of the Asuras were again Kshatriyas like Kamsa and Naraka but not admitted into the orthodox Aryan fold though having martial relation with them. Panini (600-300 B.C.) mentions a peculiar compounding of the names of Sudra, with whom interdining of the higher castes was permitted¹³. Again, members of the same tribe were Kshatriyas in one country like the Rathores of Rajputana and Sudras in another like the Rattods or Reddis in Andhra. On the whole, the people of Western India tended to be orthodox and those of the Eastern and the Southern to be somewhat heterodox, the difference being that the former clung more tenaciously to the Vedic and the Brahmanic cult and the latter were prone to rationalization and spiritual discipline, though very slowly introducing caste divisions. In course of time, special occupations too were attached to castes and sub castes, the latter consisting of tribal divisions within the main castes and of the progeny of inter-caste marriages. By about the fourth century B.C., caste became crystallized all over India.

Whatever be the disadvantages of caste to present-day India, there were some great principles involved in its formation. The conquered tribes and races were not only not exterminated but also given a place in the Aryan social fold. Even those who were left out of the four castes and constituted the fifth caste of

13. *Ashtadhyayi*, I, 2, 22.

prohibited the destruction of the life and property of non-combatants. So though kings were destroying each other, life in the country went on in the usual way. The spectacle of the peasant with his hand on the plough and watching peacefully from the fields the rows of chariots, elephants, cavalry and foot-soldiers belonging to rival armies march along the highway to the beat of drums was common in India then, which disappeared from the time of Muslim invasions. Kings fought, but very often for recognition, which was again in many cases a token. Wars were not peoples' wars but of kings; peoples were always friends. Kings fought for the heroic ideal, not in greed. This is the second consequence of the caste system. The third was that it rendered the specialization of professions more easy, when instruction was given by example rather than by theory. As occupations were hereditary, the parent taught his son, and taught him with affection and sincerity. Lastly, as shown in the above para, each group was allowed the freedom to develop spiritually in its own way, without losing its economic hold on society. And it should be noted that in the beginning individuals were raised in caste as well as lowered.¹⁶

It is unnecessary to write upon the evils of caste system, as much has been written upon the topic by sociologists, psychologists and historians. As it has been observed, the spirit behind the formation of castes was lost sight of. Mutual jealousies between castes, lack of social solidarity, impossibility of social movement, and unadaptability to new changing conditions are the natural results of caste rigidity. But this is not the same as saying that the castes constantly fight with each other, that Hindu society is not a unity, that Hinduism means many religions, and that the lower castes do not care to be called Hindus.

Though inwardness was achieved by the Hinduism of the time, life on earth was not spurned. The people of the Rigvedic times pray for progeny, wives, wealth and many worldly and

16. *Jatyuktavsha* and *Jatyajuktavsha*. See Kane's work referred to above, pp. 61 foll.

the pre-Aryan settlers, were followers of sex-worship, either as the worship of the Mother-goddess or as that of the phallus; some were practising yoga or the worship of the in-dwelling spirit. The Aryans of the time already saw that the light within man and that in the sun were one in essence. The worship of light seemed to them the most high, sober and rational religious practice, to which they subordinated and in the light of which they interpreted every other. Thus all external forms were treated as symbols of the inner. It was not easy to teach the primitive barbarians the practice of inner worship. Hence the Aryans allowed them to continue their old practices, at the same time pointing out that those practices had an inner meaning. This attitude towards the less cultured resulted in toleration and accommodation and also in the system of castes and sub castes. But then when once the castes were formed and crystallized and regarded as belonging to the same Hindu society, the spirit behind the formation in the past was lost sight of; and tribes which were allowed to develop their life in their own way were not allowed to develop it in any other way, so far as religious sanctions went.

One great boon which caste system conferred upon India was a peculiar unity of social and cultural pattern in spite of ritual diversity. Politics belonged in general to the ruling Kshatriya caste, which often, though not always, employed Brahmin advisers, because the latter, accustomed to constant self-control and spiritual self-discipline, were less prone to be carried away by passion in their judgments. The village, with its castes and sub castes, to which were assigned the necessary productive occupations, was a self-sufficient social unit, which paid its taxes to the ruler, whoever he might be. Wars between kingdoms were the concern of the ruling Kshatriyas. This statement holds true only in general. Some imperial dynasties like those of the Sungas, the Kanvas, the Andhras, and the Kadambas are said to be Brahmin and of the Gupta's Vaisya. But as ruling classes, they intermarried with the Kshatriyas. The Aryan Dharma

It has already been mentioned that in Eastern and Southern India there were peoples who did not recognize the supremacy of the Vedic and Brahmanic culture. Further, the Vedic cult of sacrifice to gods of nature and the Sakta cult of Mother-worship, involving likewise animal and even human sacrifices, transgressed reasonable bounds. Many sects, though declared heterodox, felt that true religion did not lie that way. The Upanishadic seers also felt similarly, but were perhaps not powerful enough to stop those practices. Attempts therefore were made to discover true religion and weed out symbolism and ritual. Truth had to be known in its purity; and the method of its realization was to be rationalized and direct. If symbols stand for certain facts, why not grasp the facts and leave the symbols, which may mislead? The Upanishads, as parts of the Vedas, teach the same spiritual truth in its purity; but the Vedas give their authoritative support to so many other undesirable practices and so have to be discarded. The Upanishadic truths might be discovered anew by each man, if they are truths at all. Of the people who adopted this attitude, Buddha and Mahavira, both of the 6th century B. C., stand out supreme. Of these two, Buddha, who had a peculiar charm of personality, attracted more attention of the world, and his gospel spread almost from the Pacific to the Atlantic.

Till very recently, it was the practice to treat Buddhism and Jainism as different from Hinduism. But we should not forget that the word Hinduism was not known to Buddha and Mahavira. Both knew the words Vedic Dharma and Brahmanism; and it is to them that they were on the whole opposed. But along with orthodox religious leaders, they were claiming their religion to be Arya Dharma. We should therefore infer that both the orthodox and the heterodox were claiming to be the true representatives of Arya Dharma. So if the word Hinduism is to stand for the religion that claims continuity from the times before Buddha and Mahavira, Hinduism should mean the same as Arya Dharma; and as Brahmanism, Buddhism and Jainism, all claim to be the Arya Dharma, all the three should be treated as branches of Arya Dharma and so of Hinduism. This true perspective will

heavenly comforts. Even after the Aryans realised that the Ultimate Truth lay within and could be realized by turning the gaze inward, they exhorted men to strive for the values of the world by propitiating gods through sacrifices. Women were not treated as personifications of sin, and *sannyasa* (renunciation) was not taught as the sole path to salvation. Prof. Kane writes that "the word *asrama* does not occur in the Samhitas or the *Brahmanas*",¹⁷ which are the earliest parts of the Vedas. *Asramas* are the stages into which the Aryans divided man's life for its gradual inwardization. In the later developed Hinduism during the time of the *Dharmasastras*, they are four in number: *brahmacharya* or the life of the student, *garhastya* or the life of the householder, *vanaprasthya* or the life of the forest-dweller, and *sannyasa* or the life of renunciation. In the first stage, man acquires knowledge from his teacher; in the second, he goes through the experiences of the world and enjoys its values as a dutiful member of his society; in the third, he leaves home with his wife and reflects upon his experiences and evaluates them; and in the fourth, he renounces everything and turns his gaze within. Now there is evidence that the early Rigvedic Aryans knew the first three, but not the fourth. Even the *Chhandogya* speaks of only the first three.¹⁸ However, the Vedic Aryans knew of *munis* (observers of silence), whom they extolled, and of *yatis*, whom they destroyed. Prof. Kane thinks that the latter were sorcerers practising *yatu* (black magic). The later Upanishads speak of *sannyasa*. Even earlier Yajna-vaalkya is said to have left home and family. But perhaps this renunciation was of a different kind from that which seems to have gained a place of recognition in the Hindu scheme of life after Buddhism left its impress on the social life of India. Further, the post-Buddhist Upanishads advocate renunciation the moment one feels disinterested in the world, even without going through the earlier three *asramas*, a practice definitely due to Buddhist influence.

17. *History of Dharmasastra*, Vol. II, part I, p. 418.

18. II, 23, 1.

Buddha never spoke of social inequalities. Fourthly, the reasons which all Buddhists accept for Buddha's leaving his home were old age, disease and death, but not any social injustices that pained him or from which he suffered. Lastly, Buddhists never cared to formulate a social code like the *Code of Manu*. Buddhism was confined mainly to monasteries. It was a religious order, though heterodox, within Hinduism. It never attempted to form a casteless society. But it saw no reason why members of all castes and races could not realize the Inner Truth by following the same method of renunciation and psychological analysis. Wherever it spread, either in Siberia, China, Tibet, Annam, Burma or Ceylon, it never tried to reform or disturb the existing social order. Herein lies its greatness as well as its weakness: greatness in being a purely spiritual religion, not caring to enter the scheme of mundane life, namely, of the individual and society; and weakness in having no hold on society just for that reason. When Hinduism offered, for instance, to meet the same spiritual need by introducing *sannyasa* and later by incorporating Buddhist philosophy and making Buddha an incarnation of Vishnu, no Indian felt the loss of Buddhism. It is for this reason that Buddhism appealed to the people of every country as the religion *par excellence* with uncontaminated ethics and spirituality. But it was very easy to eradicate it as it was confined to monasteries and the lay disciple's social life was allowed to continue in the old way. In contrast to Buddhism, Jainism adopted a social scheme almost along lines of the Hindus, or rather, it fitted itself into the Hindu social scheme, and so did not disappear from India.

The Mauryan emperors of India patronized Jainism and Buddhism. Chandragupta (4th century B. C.), the founder of the Mauryan dynasty, became a Jain and Asoka (3rd century B. C.) embraced Buddhism. Both the names are two of the greatest in Indian history, the latter in world history also. Asoka's empire extended from Afghanistan in the north to almost the Cape Comorin in the south; but he was the only emperor

enable any one to see that Buddhism and Jainism were only reform movements within Hinduism. As I said elsewhere, they are its unorthodox forms only, and are "as intimately connected with it as Sikkism, Virasaivism, the Brahmo Samaj, the Arya Samaj, and Tamil Saivism. We should not overlook the fact that some forms of Saivism in the South do not at all accept the Vedas as an authority ; and yet their followers are Hindus".¹⁹ To be heterodox does not prevent a man from being a Hindu ; for even as late as the 8th century A. D., Sankara denounced the Pancharatra and its Agamas as unorthodox because they claim superiority even to the Vedas. Yet the followers of the Pancharatra are Hindus. Nor is it necessary to acknowledge the authority of the Vedas in order to be called a Hindu ; for some forms of Tamil Saivism, as pointed out above, do not make that acknowledgement and yet are called Hindu. Hinduism has no articles of faith listed in any book ; it is therefore unnecessary to ask: "What is the dogma in which I should believe in order to be a Hindu" Hinduism would treat such faith as easy religion and as an insult to man's intelligence. Nor is it necessary to follow any particular social custom or practice ; for some sects of Sudras have still their own forms of marriage. If religion is the quest for the inner spirit, Buddha and Mahavira wanted that its nature should be known in its nakedness, without regard to established forms. That the inward spirit was the truth of religion even the orthodox could not deny. It was the affirmation of this truth that made every Indian of the time a Hindu.

Another mistaken interpretation is calling Buddha a statesman and a social reformer. A few Indians also adopted this fashion. First, this interpretation was due to the criticism of Christians and Muslims, one of the main targets of which was the Hindu caste system ; for to point to a casteless religion of India was supposed to be a fitting answer. Secondly, we should not forget that, during the time of Buddha, there was no rigid caste system in Eastern India, which required reform. In the third place,

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emphasized. First, Buddhism laid all emphasis on one single path (*marga*), namely, the way of renunciation. That is why, it confined itself to monasteries. Monastic life became so great a fashion in Magadha, the chief province of the Magadhan Empire, that it soon lost its original name and acquired the name of Bihar, "The Land of Viharas" or monasteries. The best and the most intelligent men were thereby lost to society and the economic life of the community suffered. We read that, in China when the evil effects of the monastic fashion of life were recognized, thousands of monasteries were closed and monks and nuns were forced to take to secular life.²¹ The orthodox religion, on the other hand, recognized several other *margas* (ways), particularly *karmamarga* (way of action) and *bhakti-marga* (way of devotion). Though life was divided into four *asramas*, it was not necessary to go through the last *asrama*. Janaka, for instance, did not give up his house-holder's life. The ideal that one should go through one's family and social duties, without at the same forgetting that one is only an instrument in the hands of God, was equally well encouraged. In the second place, the Upanishads always insisted that man as a microcosm was a reflection of the macrocosm whatever be their ultimate nature. The sun (*akāś*), which was according to them, the centre and source of the world, was identical with the self (*ātman*), which was the centre and source of the individual experience. Realization of the *Ātman* was realization of the Brahman. The outward was not therefore lost by turning inward. But, for the Buddhists, realization lay in simply analysing away the *ātman* or *pudgala*. Thus, as I have said, what was a conquest for the Upanishads was reduced to an escape by the Buddhists.

The Brahmanic reaction naturally followed with success. The admission of nuns into monasteries led to corruption which is admitted by . . .

21. See . . .
H. W.

and the rejection of Buddhism". *Journal of the History of Ideas* January 1931.

22. See Roerich: *History of Buddhism*.

who justly could speak of himself as governing the vast empire with Dharma (Law) and not with the sword. Buddha's gospel spread like wild fire throughout the world, and Buddhist missionaries enthusiastically crossed the seas to preach it. It was a message of hope and peace to humanity suffering from man's cruelty to man in hardened egoism. It was not a new truth to the Indians; even the most staunch Buddhists now recognize that it was a continuation of the Upanishadic tradition; but divested of the encumbering ritual and symbolism, it had a freshness and directness which could easily impress the susceptible minds of the Indians; and Indian religion became intensely inward. The four fundamental truths of Buddhism are: the world is full of pain; pain has causes; there can be cessation of pain; and there must be a method for effecting the cessation. This is a factual analysis of the human situation in the cosmos, as Buddhism saw it. But the analysis proclaims that world is a vale of misery. Buddha might not have taught such thorough-going pessimism. But this was what Buddhism preached sometime after his death. And without thinking that inward realization was an achievement, many Indians came to regard it as a necessary escape. Spiritual inwardness became one-sidedly intense. It is true that Buddhism made India exceptionally spiritual and religious. But some of its great admirers had to admit that its after-effects were passivity, pessimism, enervation, one-sided other-worldliness, loss of vigour and zest for life. However great it might be as a spiritual force, the effects of Buddhism, as a social and political factor, upon India of the time were on the whole harmful. Even Havell writes, after extolling its ethical and spiritual greatness: "At the same time Buddhism as a social and political creed contained within itself elements of weakness which after Asoka's death led quickly to the break-up of the the Mauryan Empire".²⁰

In the opinion of the author, certain differences between the Buddhist and the Vedic or Brahmanic outlooks cannot be over

emphasized. First, Buddhism laid all emphasis on one single path (*marga*), namely, the way of renunciation. That is why it confined itself to monasteries. Monastic life became so great a fashion in Magadha, the chief province of the Magadhan Empire, that it soon lost its original name and acquired the name of Bihar, "The Land of Viharas" or monasteries. The best and the most intelligent men were thereby lost to society and the economic life of the community suffered. We read that, in China when the evil effects of the monastic fashion of life were recognized, thousands of monasteries were closed and monks and nuns were forced to take to secular life.²¹ The orthodox religion, on the other hand, recognized several other *margas* (ways), particularly *karmamarga* (way of action) and *bhakti-marga* (way of devotion). Though life was divided into four *asramas*, it was not necessary to go through the last *asrama*. Janaka, for instance, did not give up his house-holder's life. The ideal that one should go through one's family and social duties, without at the same time forgetting that one is only an instrument in the hands of God, was equally well encouraged. In the second place, the Upanishads always insisted that man as a microcosm was a reflection of the macrocosm whatever be their ultimate nature. The sun (*ahar*), which was according to them, the centre and source of the world, was identical with the self (*aham*), which was the centre and source of the individual experience. Realization of the *Atman* was realisation of the *Brahman*. The outward was not therefore lost by turning inward. But, for the Buddhists, realization lay in simply analysing away the *atman* or *padma*. Thus, as I have said, what was a conquest for the Upanishads was reduced to an escape by the Buddhists.

The Brahmanic reaction naturally followed with success. The admission of monks into monasteries led to corruption, which is admitted by Buddhist writers themselves,²² and lent support to

21 Sophia H. Chen Zen: *Chinese Culture*, p. 52. See also Arthur H. Wright: "Fa and the Rejection of Buddhism". *Journal of the History of Ideas*, January 1931.

22 See Borton: *History of Buddhism*.

the Brahmanic revival. The Mauryas were succeeded by the Sungas in 183 B. C., who supported Brahmanism as against Buddhism. The social evils of Buddhism already began to be felt; but the antidote, the Indians thought, lay in the reassertion of Brahmanism in its strictest forms. It is to this period that the *Manudharmasastra* (*The Code of Manu*), with its great emphasis upon the supremacy of the Brahmins, belongs.²³ After ruling for a little over a century, the Sungas were followed by the Kanvas. Towards the end of the 1st. century B. C., the latter were succeeded by the Andhras, who ruled for about four centuries.

It was during the time of the Andhras (also called Satavahanas) that Buddhism again raised its head. But it became more Upanishadic than before. The two Mahayana schools, the Madhyamika and the Yogachara, started by Nagarjuna and Maitreyanatha, belonged to this period. Nagarjuna (2nd. century A. D.) was patronized by the Andhras and, though he was the most dominating figure in all the Buddhist universities in both the South and the North, his permanent abode was on the Nagarjuna Hill near Amaravati on the banks of the Krishna. Maitreyanatha belonged to the North. The former expounded the doctrine that the ultimate nature of the world is *sunya* (void), which echoed the Upanishadic doctrine of the indeterminate Brahman (*nirgunabrahman*), and the latter preached that it is pure formless *vijnana* (consciousness), which also came near to the Upanishadic view that the Brahman is pure consciousness (*चित्*). Though the Andhra emperors gave splendid encouragement to Buddhism, they did not discourage Brahmanism. One of them even proclaimed himself to be a Brahmin. Like the Sungas, they performed the horse sacrifice in the orthodox fashion to proclaim their suzerainty over the whole of India. These facts justify our understanding this age as the age of the gradual coming together, through both rivalry and absorption, of Buddhism and Brahmanism. The naked directness of the

23. See Jayaswal: *Manu and Yajnavalkya*.

Buddhist *sadhana* (method of realization or *marga* or path of realization) was by degrees giving place to other ways (*marṣas*) advocated by the orthodox,²⁴ which was encouraged by both the Andhras and the Kushans. During this period was written the *Code of Yajñavalkya*, in which the incomparable supremacy given by Manu to the Brahmins was lowered. The orthodox Hindus up to the time, even the Brahmins, were non-vegetarians. But from this time vegetarianism began to be adopted by the orthodox under the influence of Jainism and Buddhism.

After the collapse of the Andras in the 3rd or the 4th century A. D. the Guptas rose to power in the North. It was at the court of one of these Guptas, Chandragupta II, that Kalidasa, the greatest Sanscrit poet and the author of *Sakuntala*, flourished. The Gupta Age was the Age of Hindu revival and the Golden Age of Sanscrit literature. It should, however, be noted that Buddhism was not suppressed or persecuted by the Guptas in the way it is sometimes represented. It was allowed to continue, though it did not receive that amount of imperial patronage which it did from the Mauryas, the Andhras and the Kushans. It is said that Skandhagupta was a zealous disciple of Vasubandha, one of the greatest exponents of Vijnanavada Buddhism. This also shows that the difference between Buddhism and Brahmanism was wearing thinner and thinner until Buddhism was finally absorbed and vanished in the 16th century. It just lingered on during the time of the Vizianagar Empire. During the rule of Harsha of Kanauj (7th century), who was a scion of the Guptas, it received again priority in royal patronage, after which time we have no instance of any great monarch making it his state religion. In the 8th century, the Brahmanic reaction was consummated by Sankara, who incorporated the philosophy of later Buddhism. Even earlier, Sankara's grand teacher, Gautapada, did it in his *Manusmṛtya Karika*. That was the time when great spiritual leaders were changing from Brahmanism and Buddhism to

24. See Havell. *Art and Architecture in India*, p. 133

Buddhism and Brahmanism in order to discover which spiritual discipline would take one deeper. Bhartrihari is an outstanding example. Gaudapada himself is supposed to have been a Buddhist at first. And we find that not only was Buddhist Vijñānavāda assimilated but also was the Buddhist concept of Sunya (Void) incorporated by the growing sects of Saivism and Vaishnavism ²⁵

25. See the author's article, "An Unnoticed Aspect of Gaudapada's *Māṇḍūkya-kārikas*" (Vol XXVI, Part I, *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*).



INDIA'S CULTURE AND HER PROBLEMS.

LECTURE II.

Indian Culture as Integrated.

The best expressions of Hindu culture in religion, art, music, literature, politics and social organisation took definite shape by about the 8th century. Social divisions were crystallized even by the time of Manu, that is, the Sunga period. But Brahmanism and Buddhism, the two main contestants, did not yet settle the issues then. It took about fourteen centuries to realize fully that Buddhism endeavoured to teach the same highest truth of the Upanishads, and so for final absorption and assimilation. Havell says "It was the Brahmanic intellect more than the Kshatriya sword which led to the downfall of the Buddhist Sangha."²⁶ The truth is that the contestants not only argued intellectually about each other's highest concepts but also tried to verify spiritually their corresponding realities, thus implicitly accepting the absolutism of the Inner Spirit, by whatever name it was called. It is this that gives unity of perspective to the whole of Indian Philosophy and religion, which is unfortunately missed by some of its interpreters including some Indians. Some Indians who have seen this feature of the Upanishadic tradition have not seen it consistently enough. The Upanishads do not present a system of philosophy. It is the schools, the founders of which wrote commentaries on the Upanishads, that attempts to give systems. Each school has its own stand-point, *advaita* (non-dualism), *dvaita* (dualism), *vishishtadvaita* (non-dualism of the determinate brahman), *dvaitadvaita* (dualism-cum non dualism), idealism, realism and so forth. It is therefore thought that the Upanishads have no stand-point of their own. But there is a stand point higher than the stand-point of the schools, which is accepted by all of them and which is found in the Upanishads. It is the stand-point of the inward Absolute²⁷.

26. *Argun Role in India*, p. 137.

27. See *Brahmasutras*, IV, 1, 3.

All schools accept that the highest reality has to be realized within as one's self, whatever be the interpretation put upon the word self. The Absolute is within us; it may be the Self of our selves, may be identical with them, different from them, or partly identical with and partly different from them; it may be inclusive of matter or exclusive of it, or matter may not have a different being at all from it : these are secondary details. In Indian Philosophy distinctions like realism, idealism, pluralism, dualism, and monism fall within the absolutism of the Inner Spirit. To ignore this feature is to miss the primary characteristic of Indian Philosophy and culture. This holds true not only of the Vedantic and other orthodox systems but also of Buddhism and, in a very significant sense, of Jainism, both of which differ from the orthodox tradition only in rejecting the authority of the Vedas. Even Jaina scholars now claim Vedic origin for their religion.²⁸ King Rishabha of the Vedas is claimed to be one of the earliest Jaina teachers, and it is even said that early "Saivism and Jainism were one and the same."²⁹

The same spiritual depth was striven after in literature also. Literature, in fact no fine art, was regarded as a pastime. Its aim was highly ethical and spiritual. Even the earliest writers saw the contagious and educative influence of poetry and the advantage of utilizing it for making people follow the Bharata Dharma or Arya Dharma (the way of life of Bharata or the Aryans). Vidyānātha, the author of *Prataparudriyam*, says that the Vedas teach a man by word of command, the Purāṇas like friends tell him what is good and bad, but a poem like a sweet heart charms him into doing what it wants. The tendency of the reader of a poem or the spectator of a drama is to imitate the hero through a sort of psychological identification. And he identifies himself with the hero through fascination for him produced by poetic charm. So the hero's character has to be developed according to the ideas of Bharata Dharma. This was

28. Chakravarti "Contribution of Buddhism and Jainism to the Cultural Unity of India", *The Vedanta Kesari*, Dec, 1942.

29. *Op cit.*, p. 179.

seen by Asvaghosha, the Buddhist, who wrote his poem *Buddhacharita* (*The Story of Buddha*) and also *Saundarananda* (*Sundarant Nanda*), in order to preach the Buddhist ideal of life. It is for this reason that the Puranas or Epics are treated as Vedāṅgas or studies subsidiary to the Vedas. Puranas are grand world histories dealing with creation, dissolution, some dynasty, its relation to the originators of humanity and its achievements. Most of the Puranas were written to extol a particular sect, god or dynasty, but all uphold the same spiritual truths. But with such an ambitious aim, they mixed up a lot of mythological with historical material. However, what we call epics include not only Puranas but also *Itihāsas*, which are histories proper, and *mahākavyas* or great poems. An *itihāsa* is defined as a story which is interwoven with advice about *dharma* (duty), *artha* (wealth), *kāma* (love), and *moksha* (salvation). A *mahākavya* is one in which only one *bhāva* (emotion, sentiment) is primary.¹⁰

The theory of emotions and sentiments and the realization of the Brahman through their aesthetic enjoyment (*rāsa*) is a peculiar contribution of Indian culture. This feature of our experience was discovered long ago by the Hindus; but it was Bharata, the author of *Nāṭyaśāstra* (*The Theory of Dance*) who systematised both the theory and art and became the authority to all subsequent writers. He says that there are nine *bhāvas* (emotions, sentiments), love, humour, anger, enthusiasm (heroism), pity, wonder, dread, disgust, and peace. The corresponding *rāsas* (aesthetic feelings) are also nine and are called by the same names. Of these again *santi* (peace) is the highest and is the source (*prakṛiti*) of the rest.¹⁰ When a *bhāva* (emotion, sentiment) is made stable (*sthāyī*) and enjoyable by the art of the artist, it becomes *rāsa* (aesthetic feeling); and this part belongs to the technique of art. *Rāsa* or aesthetic pleasure is a reflection, in the *sattvika* (pure) form of *buddhi* or intelligence, of the *ānanda* (bliss) of the Brahman. The

10. *Nāṭyaśāstra*, VI, 107-8

bliss of the Brahman and so the Brahman can be realized through emotional enjoyment or the sublimation of emotions. Thus not only literature, but also dance, architecture, painting and music were turned into methods (*sadhanas*) of sublimation, dealing with different material.

A most interesting and important theory developed by the ancient Hindus in this connection is that of the Sabda-brahman or the Nada-brahman (Sound-Brahman or Logos), which is the Brahman in the immediately next stage of descent to the phenomenal³¹ world. In the Bible we read of the Word or the Logos in the beginning; but later the idea plays no important role. We read also that, according to the ancient Greeks, Logos meant both Word and Reason. This idea had a wonderful development in India. If Logos is so immediately near to God, must it not possess the latter's bliss aspect also? Why should it be merely Word and Reason and not feeling also? The Logos or Sabda-brahman has diverse forms; as word, it is the unities (*sphotas*) of our words; as Reason, it would be the unities (*sphotas*) of our universals (*samanyas* or *jatis*); and as sounds tinged with emotional pleasure or feeling tone (notes), it is the melodies (*ragas*), which would also be *sphotas*. Thus *sphota* is of at least three kinds, words meaning objects, logical universals, and melodies each with its own peculiar form of feeling tone. Hence music is considered to be a *sadhana* (method) of God-realisation, the realisation of God through the experience of the Logos. The original Nada or Sabda (Sound or Word) has its own feeling tone, which is bliss; and all the melodies are reflections of it or participate in it. Music with any other aim is shallow and inferior; because it cannot touch the deepest core of our being. Music is certainly meant for enjoyment; but perfect music is for enjoyment canalized into the deepest core of our being occupied by the Logos.

In politics and social organization also the same high ideal was upheld. There is any amount of misunderstanding about

31. Cp. the idea that Christ is the son of God and the Logos.

politics and administration in the East including India, the kings being represented as tyrants and despots, before whom the subjects cringed in abject fear. But this opinion regarding India is not completely true; or rather it is not more true than what can be said about the monarchs in general of the West. Reference has already been made to what the caste system had accomplished throughout India, so far as relations between the rulers of the different kingdoms were concerned. The "Santi-parva" of the *Mahabharata*, where the king's duties are described, and even Kautilya's *Arthashastra* give the lie to such representations.¹² The king was an incarnation of Vishnu, the supporter of the Universe, and his duty was therefore to work for his people's prosperity, and seek his own happiness in theirs. He was held responsible not only for their happiness and misery, but also for their sins and merits. It was his duty to uphold Dharma (Law) and be their example. The king was to subdue himself first before he sought to subdue his foes. In few other countries do we find stories of kings becoming *rishis* (ascetics) and performing penance. To become a *rajarshi* (royal ascetic) in old age was the aspiration of Aryan kings. Even the great Chandragupta became a Jain monk in the end and left his kingdom; and Asoka's own children took to monastic life, and he himself became a Buddhist *arhat* (saint). It is not false that many kings lived evil lives. And this holds true not only of the Orient but also of the Occident. Yet, so long as the Hindu rule lasted in India, such kings did not rule long enough, for other kings were always on the watch to take advantage of their misrule. Western descriptions are based often on the observation of kings during the Muslim rule in India. The ideals placed before the kings, the religious and deep spiritual atmosphere prevailing at the courts and in the country, and the constant watch kept by kings on each other to take the earliest opportunity of misrule succeeded to a very

¹² See Harpall, *Aryan Rule in India* and R. C. Mazumdar *Outlines of Indian History and Civilization*.

large extent in preventing tyranny and despotism. And we should not forget that there were oligarchies and republics among the states of Hindu India.

We have already seen how the caste system developed as the social order of India, and how it was sought to make the scheme of castes and *asramas* a suitable instrument for the observance of Dharma and the realization of the Inner Spirit. It might be an imperfect instrument; but the Aryans found it more convenient and peaceful to transform what came in their way into an ethical and spiritual order than to build everything anew after destroying incompatible elements.

Because Hindu culture is represented as essentially spiritual, it should not be thought that Hindu India had no achievements to her credit in positive sciences. The ancient Hindus wrote on mathematics and gave the subject its zero and decimals. They wrote on physiology, embryology, anatomy, eugenics, on the use of mercury, iron and other powerful metals as medicines, on government, municipal institutions, law, warfare and even laws of nations. Regarding fine arts, they propagated the highest ideals. Most of the works were translated into Chinese and Arabic and, through them, reached all the civilized countries of the world.

Again, because India has adopted the highest spiritual stand-point in each of its cultural activities, it has wrongly been thought that it is a land of ascetics, who do not know how to enjoy life. As Henri Berr³³ says, their detachment from terrestrial realities is exaggerated. It should be noted that love and sensuality and therefore women occupy a large place in our literature. The motive behind this high spirituality is the desire to see the depth of life in every respect. None has better expressed it than Sankara, the *sannyasin* (ascetic), in his prayer to the Mother-goddess: "Let my speech be the recitation of thy name, my actions thy ritual, my lying down prostration before thee, walking the going round thee, my eating etc. an oblation

33. Grabuska, Stern and Masson-Oursel: *Ancient India*, pp. xvi xvii.

to thee, all my enjoyment the surrender of myself to thee; let everything I do be thy worship".³⁴ Here there is no indication that everything should be repounced but that every thing should be seen in the light of the Inner Spirit, whether it is called Mother, Father, or a neutral It. The Indian enjoys life; and he enjoys it to its depths. Shallow and superficial enjoyment is not his ideal. It should be deep, intense; and intensity is attained when our whole being is gripped. Hence the direction and motive of Indian music, literature and other fine arts. There can be no better proof that Indians know how to enjoy life than that afforded by Vatsyana's *Kamasutra* (*The Science of Erotics*).

For the same reason, to say that Indian art, literature etc. are religious, though not wrong, does not convey the whole meaning to non-Indians. The word 'religious' might convey the meaning that it is puritanical, austere and dry. On the other hand, it is emotively rich, highly sensitive, and touching the depths of our being. Art might have started, in the history of humanity, as the expression of emotions. In India it was not left as the expression of stray emotions; both the emotions and their expressions were sublimated till they became the emotions and expressions of the over-individual spirit within us. Its emotions can be experienced by us in moments of great exultation. Dance, for instance, is the expression of the rhythmic vibrations of the Universal Spirit as Siva, the Nataraja or the Lord of Dance.³⁵ That is the reason why traditional dances, according to orthodox Bharatanatyam, are not lewd and sensuous, though highly sensitive. They appeal to our heart, but not to our lower nature. It cannot be said, however, that to practice all Indian dances are inspired by this high ideal.

How best can we characterize Indian culture? Is it aesthetic, intellectual, pragmatic or religious? The most suitable term seems to be spiritual. We have already pointed to the misunder-

³⁴ *Amn Lalshari*, 28.

³⁵ Havell, *Art and Culture in India*, p. 239.

large extent in preventing tyranny and despotism. And we should not forget that there were oligarchies and republics among the states of Hindu India.

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perfect, dance made perfect, literature made perfect, perfection being measured by the degree to which art etc. are able to grip man's deepest being. That is why we find so much metaphysics in Indian religion. Man is not merely to know but to become the metaphysical truth. And though reason is discouraged as being never conclusive (*apratishthanat*), Indian Philosophy is through and through rational, reaching the very bounds of reason. That is why Indian religion is treated sometimes as gnosticism.

Some Western writers characterize Indian religion, in short, all eastern religion, as aesthetic.⁵⁶ The word aesthetic may convey the meaning that the Indians are satisfied with a cult that pleases their aesthetic sense. This meaning is both true and false. So far as worship at home goes, every attempt is made to decorate the rooms of worship as richly as possible. But worship in temples, particularly in the Saivait temples, is quite austere. We should not forget that external worship, according to Hinduism, is symbolical of psychological sublimation of our selves—sublimation not in the metaphorical sense of education but in the literal and factual sense—until the Universal Self is reached. The process of sublimation may take several ethical, emotional and intellectual forms, all being treated as forms of Yoga or *sadhana*. To live one's life without losing one's bearings to the Inner Spirit is Yoga. As this psychological significance is not lost sight of in Indian religion, it may appear aesthetic to the outsider. But the word aesthetic is misleading. It may mean merely the sensuous or what pertains to beauty only. Indian religion is not confined to either or both.

The word aesthetic may also convey the meaning that Indian Philosophy and religion are unethical. In fact, there has been such a criticism made for a long time by Western writers.⁵⁷ It is

56. Northrop, *Meeting of East and West*, p. 403. In our personal use Professor Northrop explained that he did not mean what we object to. Still there is the possibility of some of his readers taking that meaning.

57. See Sir Charles Eliot: *Hinduism and Buddhism*, Vol. I, p. XVI and also Mcleod: *Indian Ethics*. Hopkins, in his *Ethics of India* 1933, a different view.

standings which the word *religious* may produce. Further, the word may mean also what accords with an institutionalized religion, the sanction for which was obtained from some historical person of some remote past. The word may suggest the desire to perpetuate the conditions of society belonging to some antiquity. The *Code of Manu* may perhaps be pointed to in support of this meaning. But there are several Hindu codes differing in details which indicate the existence of progressive thinking on social matters. The word *pragmatic* may have both a narrow and wide meaning. It may mean that the culture is directed towards the accumulation of worldly wealth, just as the word *American* is sometimes made to mean. Indian culture is certainly not so. Wealth is recognized to be one of the four aims of life, the others being *dharma* (duty), *kama* (love), and *moksha* (salvation). But *moksha* is regarded as the highest of all. The *pragmatic* is not a self-sufficient ideal. Wealth is useful of course; but useful for what? Of course, for the human being. That is why pragmatism needs humanism for its completion. But humanism, in its turn, is not self-sufficient; and this becomes evident if we raise the question: What is man? The validity and importance of a philosophy of humanism would then depend upon how man is understood. Is man merely a social unit to be understood in terms of society? Or is he merely a physiological organism to be understood in terms of biology, physiology and anatomy? Or is he merely a structural pattern of atoms to be understood in terms of physics and chemistry? Indian Philosophy accepts all these ideas, and yet goes beyond and traces man's identity with the Universal Self. Should we then say that Indian culture is intellectual? Yes, it is intellectual, but not merely intellectual. Intellect is a servant of life, and our life reaches up to the Infinite Spirit. Hence the deep metaphysical tone of Indian culture in all its aspects. But this metaphysics is not dry rationalism, as some interpreters of Indian thought take it to be. It is a philosophy of life, not a mere abstract speculation. It is a philosophy of every expression of life, idealized and made

primarily the duties of monks and nuns. The duties of *śrāvakas* (listeners, lay disciples) come into consideration only incidentally. And this Buddhist attitude to ethics was not without influence on orthodox Hinduism.

In accordance with the above criticism, we should say that any culture would be ethical, if it gives primacy to ethical values embodied in social ideals. Such a culture would value religion for the sake of ethics. For instance, in comparative religion when we say that one religion is higher than another for representing its gods as more moral, we are implicitly giving primacy to ethical values. But if the question, which ethical standards are higher is raised, ethics itself cannot answer. Here it betrays its self-transcendence.⁴⁰ Western philosophers would say that it becomes metaphysics; but the Indian would say that its standards now become spiritual. In the field of spiritual as well as that of social discipline, self-control is needed. So if a new definition of ethics as the science of self-control is given, then it is the realms in which self-control is exercised that differentiate between the forms of ethics. The important point then to note is that these realms should not be allowed to fall apart but should be graded into a continuous scheme of life. It is not meant that these stages should be castes and *āśramas* with their traditional rigidity; but that it is necessary to graduate life in such a way that social values do not suffer and yet can be transvalued and sublimated so that they can find their fulfilment in becoming spiritual values. Critics of Indian thought who say that it is unethical do not see that ethics is not self-sufficient but self-transcendent. Even if we accept an ethical analysis like that given by Plato in his *Republic*, we shall have to go beyond man and society in order to understand the full nature of man. The great problem for leaders of society would then be to strike a balance between ethics aiming at the realization of social values and that aiming at the realization of spiritual values. There would be no conflict between the two, unless one is made

⁴⁰ See Frazer, *Ethical Studies* and compare Hegel's views also on the subject.

said that India produced great metaphysical systems, but not a single system of ethics. It is even said that Indians, in spite of the austerities and asceticism they practice, are unethical in their conduct. In answer to this latter charge, the reader may be referred to the writings of other Europeans right from Megasthenes to Abbe Dubois, who formed quite a different opinion. It is true that the Indian, either the Hindu or the Muslim, will not identify himself with the social laws of the Europeans, who may forget that their moral code is just one of many. If morality consists in controlling one's inclinations and propensities, in short, in self-control, no other religion or philosophy laid greater emphasis on it than the Indian. Too often it is repeated in Indian writings that the senses are horses, mind the rein, and that one should control the horses by the rein and not allow oneself to be led astray by them.³⁸ Self-control is an indispensable step, coming under *yama* and *niyama*,³⁹ in spiritual progress. Yet, Indian culture, just as it is not merely aesthetic, is not merely ethical. Every Indian has to perform his duties (*dharma*s) as prescribed by his caste and *asrama*. But the performance of his duties is not an end in itself. They are performed with an ulterior aim, the realization of the Universal Self in man. One point may have to be admitted. When Buddhism, which confined itself to monasteries, worked out the monastic ideal, its ethics did not touch social duties as such, but laid all emphasis on self-control. The difference is perhaps best expressed by saying that self-control was more a psychological technique than a social virtue for Buddhism, whereas it was equally both for Brahmanism. Indeed, Brahmanism, after it introduced *sannyasa* as a fourth *asrama*, gradually converted this realization of urges into simple stoppage of activity. But this stage came last; and social ideals did not suffer. The scheme of *asramas* preserved them. Hindu ethical codes deal elaborately with the duties of all *asramas* and castes. But Buddhist Vinaya texts discuss

38. *Katha*, III, 4.

39. Special and regular rules of self-control.

judgment that they are imperfect attempts at harmony. On the other hand, they were some of the perfect attempts of harmonising without destroying, and sublimating without insulting several forms of cult and worship. For instance, in Chidambaram, we find innumerable images of gods, goddesses etc., as decorative detail on the temple; but within, as the Holy of the Holies, lies pure *akasa* (ether, space), which is simply nothing or emptiness. Whether the temple be of Siva as ether or as any other element, or of Vishnu in any of his aspects, the same principle is followed. To trace in the Puranas how the gods superseded one another would form an interesting study; but the superseded gods are given some place near or over the temple.

Similarly in painting and statue-construction also we can discern the embodiment of the same spiritual ideal. The charming peace animating and radiating from Buddha's images is quite well known. It is not naturalism, realism, human charm and accuracy, but idealism, sublimation, and spiritual transformation and charm that are placed before the artist as the highest ideals. Indeed, aesthetic effects are aimed at, but they are transformed into spiritual effects, which are the completion of the merely aesthetic. It is usual to characterize Indian art as religious and mystical. Perhaps these two words do not convey its important psychological and rational aspects. The word spiritual seems to be less misleading even here.⁴²

We may say with a fair amount of justification that the important traits of Indian culture showed themselves throughout India by the 4th century B. C., and were fairly well-articulated by about the 4th century A. D. This culture retained most of its original forms upto the advent of the West as West, not as Christianity; for the essence of Christianity, its purely spiritual element of finding joy in the union with the Divine, is peculiarly Eastern if not Indian. As pointed out already, the spiritual origin of all religions, not excluding Islam, Christianity,

⁴² For *deva* is about art, see Havell, *Indian Sculpture and Painting* and *The Ideals of Indian Art*, and A. K. Coomaraswamy, *National Idealism as Transformation of Nature in Art*.

to do the duties of the other.⁴¹ Self-control for the realization of spiritual values alone without reference to social values, as in Buddhism, may result ultimately in psychological prevention of the activity of our urges useful for society; and self-control for the realization of social values alone may result in literal obedience to the prevailing laws of society and so in social stagnation and, where the social laws of groups differ, in social conflicts. Social values in any concrete form do not possess absoluteness, which spiritual values have. So in the life of both the individual and society, both values should be allowed to play their role.

How the greatest spiritual heights reached by Indian culture have been reflected in arts, literature and political and social life of the people has already been indicated. Indian music has an intensity and depth surpassed by no other music. It should not, however, be thought that it does not aim at pleasure. Pleasure (*sukha, ananda, rasa*) is a reflection of the nature of the Brahman in its aspect as Logos. The nature of the Brahman is *ananda, rasa*. It is made to reflect itself in our mind (*buddhi*) through music. The ideal of music is thus to grip our being through pleasure. Music as a fine art is connected very intimately with our psychical life. Even in other fine arts, which are less intimately connected, the same ideal is upheld. In architecture, particularly of temples, we cannot understand the motive behind their construction if we forget that the discovery of the highest spiritual ideal did not prompt the Hindu to discard and destroy the earlier forms of cult and worship, but to treat them as symbols of the highest and of the processes of its realization. So lower gods and forms of worship occupy the exterior of the shrine, while the inside is the abode of the Holy of the Holies. If the dragons and other gods are viewed merely as decorations, we would be missing the deeper meaning of temple construction, ignoring history and passing naturally the

41. This conflict was present not only in India but also in Europe during the Middle Ages when Catholic Christianity attracted the flower of humanity to its monasteries.

This spiritual element, on which Hinduism has never lost its hold, is the universal and essential element of all ancient religions and cultures. By laying the primary emphasis upon it and making it the unifying principle for cultural stability and progress, Hinduism has retained its claim to universality. But in the claim to universality, as I remarked above, Buddhism as a religion went even higher. It suited itself to all climes and societies. It never carried a set of social laws to be enforced upon its converts; and in this respect, it differs from other proselytizing religions like Islam and Christianity. Both the latter religions, in their institutionalized forms, may be traced to *Judaism*, which is tribal in origin. The God of the Jews was a tribal god, who was partial to one tribe and inimical to the rest. Though Christianity claimed to be universal and ceased to be tribal, it retained its particularity (as opposed to universality) by insisting that salvation was possible only through Christ. Islam also endeavoured to become a universal religion and spread outside Arabia. But still it retained its tribal features by conferring special privileges upon converts into its fold and refusing the same to others. But Hinduism had its origin in the worship of natural forces and in psychological discipline; and for this reason the early Aryans had no need even of temples much less of idols—an interesting fact for the history of religions⁴⁴. In this respect, their religion was more aniconic than Islam. Now, religion of nature, when developed, leads, as Marvin says, ⁴⁵ to science and rationalism. And really Hindu religion became thoroughly rationalized and systematized its psychological technique. Just as there is no scientific practice without scientific theory, there is no Indian religion without a philosophical theory. The uniqueness of Indian religion lies in the development *pari passu* of both theory and practice; whereas, in the case of Islam and Christianity on the whole, theory, mostly borrowed from Greek Philosophy, is an appendix. Hinduism does not claim that the perception of truth is the monopoly of any person or religion and proclaims

⁴⁴ Havell: *Aryan Rule in India*, p. 117.

⁴⁵ *History of Philosophy*, p. 72.

and, according to some authors, even Taoism, can be traced to Indian religion. We have referred to the possible spread of Hindu religion to South America several thousands of years ago even before the Mohenjo-Daro civilisation. Even now, except Muslims and Christians, almost all people of Asia look to India as their spiritual home. Though of course, it is difficult to decide, as indicated earlier, whether religion as inner worship was introduced into India by the Aryans or whether it was adopted by them from the pre-Aryan Indians or whether it was known throughout the ancient world as evidenced by the Orphic cult of Greece, it was in India that yogic discipline and inner worship were first rationally analysed, their technique systematized and the spiritual principle formulated and made the unifying principle of the country's culture. This principle is a live one, formless but active in both giving and taking forms, "omnivorous" as it was called, and so the stabilising force in Indian life, whatever be the new forms, religious, social, political, artistic and literary, that may be introduced.

It would be wrong to say that Indian culture belongs to any particular group, caste or province in India. In fact, when the absoluteness of the Inner Truth was recognized, all cults were shown methods of inwardization. All castes were taught methods of psychological discipline, though some were prohibited from reading the Vedas: but the prohibition amounted only to the restriction to officiate at sacrifices, and did not apply to the practice of spiritual discipline. Even the cult of the Mother was developed into a wonderful system of philosophy and spiritual technique, from the practice of which not even the fifth caste was excluded.⁴³ It is said that Sankara practised it; and one of the standard works of the Sakta School, *Prapanchasara Tantra*, is attributed to him. All were allowed to study Puranas and Sanscrit literature, to practise music and dance, and take to sculpture etc., though some of these fine arts were assigned as hereditary professions to some sub-castes.

43. See the works of Woodroffe (and Avalon)

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Aryan people played the most important role. The Aryans, wherever they lived, were intellectualists and rationalizers. In India, the inner spiritual experience, which otherwise would have survived as mere effervescence and superstition, was rationalized, articulated into distinct principles, and made scientific. Afterwards these principles were applied to every branch of cultural activity. To a large extent, the geographical isolation of the Indian Aryans in the south by the sea and in the north by the Himalayas provided them for a time with comparative peaceful conditions to develop their culture. Few elements belonging to Hindu religion were borrowed from outside. So far as spirituality and philosophy are concerned, Islam and Christianity contributed nothing to Hinduism. But certain reforms in society and modes of worship like the rejection of idolatry were due to their influence. And they were introduced with the clear recognition that those truths were originally acknowledged by Hinduism. Almost every reform had a precedent in the past. Only those who ignore the history of Hinduism would say that monotheism and devotion, for instance, belong originally to Islam and Christianity. The Pancaratra and the Bhagavata cults, which developed the highest technique of devotion, are older than Christianity.

The contribution of Indian culture to the cultures of the world is great indeed. It supplied the spiritual factor, the desire for God for God's sake, the joy one finds in his presence and union with him, to all world religions. It tamed and softened the ferocity of human nature. We cannot show greater evidence for this than pointing to the theories that *sringara* (love) and *karma* (compassion) are the two *rasas* that are closest to the nature of the Divine. Bhoja, the greatest of the royal authors, whose name has become the standard for cultural patronage, says that the very nature of the self (*aham*, ego) is *sringara*, which is the only *rasa* (aesthetic pleasure). For the Buddhists, *karma* is the primary *rasa*, which is even personified and worshipped.⁴⁷ For the orthodox writers in general, like

47. See *Sadhnamala*.

that it can be seen by every person who hankers after it And is prepared to go through the necessary discipline. It has therefore a truly universal element and no dogmas of creed and cult. Its castes were originally social groups, which were allowed to retain their individualities, at the same time spiritualizing their gods and cults. Both Hinduism and Buddhism and also Jainism were not revealed religions, which contend that God was revealed once for all to some historical person in the past. All say that God or Truth may be revealed to all. No religion that does not say that Truth can be the common possession of mankind, can claim rightly to be universal.

The importance of the principles of Indian culture for world culture is now obvious. Unless religion is rationalized and its spiritual factor freed from entanglement in some historic social forms, religious conflicts cannot be avoided. In this Hinduism has shown the way, though it may still be questioned whether it applied the principle consistently throughout. But it did attempt to apply the principle to every branch of culture, and thereby was able to achieve, to a marked degree, not only the ideal of peace and mutual toleration between social groups, but also the ideal of their unification under the supreme guidance of the spiritual principle. Here is an example out of which we may extract a principle for removing social conflicts and evolving a unified culture for the world. Human and humanistic values should not be disparaged; and we have to go, at least for two reasons, beyond them in order to preserve and protect them: first, human values are relative to the group and the individual; secondly, if by inductive process we are to pick up those which are common to all, the process would result in presenting lower ideals to higher cultures and deprive them of the incentive for further progress. We should not forget that in no social study can the question of ideals be divorced from a purely inductive or psychological study.⁴⁶ And no ideal can be more universal than the spiritual.

In the spiritualization of Indian culture, the genius of the

46. See Murphy: *Experimental Social Psychology*.

and applied to religion, social uplift, political adjustments, literature and fine arts. The ideal of the White Man's Burden, in the light of the world conflagrations started by the European nations in their rivalry to share it, appears hypocritical and ironical and in comparison with Asoka's ideal of conquest by Dharma pales into insignificance. The aim of any world organization might well be the working out of a plan for a consistent application of this ideal, which would solve international, inter provincial and inter-communal conflicts. What Hinduism did on a smaller scale and with some defects, world-organizations might do on a larger scale and more successfully. It has been said that no political constitution, however, high its aim, can work well if the moral nature of the people is not changed. So long as individuals, communities, groups and societies remain selfish, aiming at more and more appropriation of earth's fruits, we can hardly expect that the best representatives will be sent either to the national or international councils. The individual's education, not merely intellectual but also moral, which would prompt him to exercise self-control in expressing his opinion and casting his vote, should be the first step in political reform for any inter-national body. This kind of reform would be cultural reform with the best of ideals in view.

Human values were divided into four kinds: *artha* (wealth), *kama* (love), *dharma* (duty), and *moksha* (salvation). Of the four each succeeding one is prior to the preceding one. One may acquire wealth, but for what purpose? It is for enjoyment and so love is higher than wealth. We may generalize and say that wealth is meant for emotive satisfaction. But emotive satisfaction should not be disorderly; it should be according to certain rules and laws, and so duty controls love. But duty for duty's sake would result in blind and literal obedience to established laws, and so *moksha* or salvation is placed higher than duty. Corresponding to the four values of life, an attempt was made to develop four types of knowledge or science (*vijnana*): *arthashastra* or the science of economics and politics, *kamashastra* or the science of erotics, *dharmastra* or the science of duty, and

Bharata, *santi* (peace) is the primary *rasa*. Thus the highest ideals in all cultural enjoyments is the enjoyment of *santi* (peace), of *karuna* (compassion), and of *sringara* (love). No higher ideal can be imagined. The Divine is by nature pure *santi*, *nirvana*, not as pure nothing, the peace of the grave, but as the undisturbed fulness of Being. We should not forget what Bharata said, namely, that the origin (*prakṛiti*) of all the other *rasas* is *santi* and that they emerge out of it when the occasion arises and merge in it when the occasion vanishes. Critics of this Indian conception wrongly picture *santi* in an objective attitude before their minds; they should, on the other hand, feel it in the fulness of their being at its depths. According to all systems of Indian thought, the highest reality is experienced within us and not without us.⁴⁸ *Sringara* and *karuna* are, though some claim them to be the highest, at least the nearest to *santi*, in that they liquify, if not liquidate, the hardened knot of egoism. Indian culture, particularly in the Buddhist forms, spread the same ideal over all earth. And the ideal is still a living force in many Asian countries. The peculiarity of this contribution may not be appreciated for two reasons: it is difficult for many to imagine that peace can be an emotion, for it is generally understood to be absence of all emotion; and secondly, when it is imagined to be absence of all emotion, it would be difficult to appreciate how it can be enjoyed. Indian psychology has here a completely new conception to offer the world. In support of this conception, we may pose another question: If peace is emptiness, absence of all activity, and therefore a negative concept, how can we advocate peace in the world, as we should then be advocating stoppage of all activity? Peace therefore cannot be a negative concept either in the economic, political or psychological fields.

From the human and the humanistic side, the best element contributed by Indian culture to civilization is the idea that for every cultural activity the ideal is the enjoyment of *santi* and also of *karuna* and *sringara*. This ideal should be generalized

INDIA'S CULTURE AND HER PROBLEMS.

LECTURE III.

The Period of Cultural Conflicts and Transformation.

When we speak of the period of cultural conflicts, it should not be understood that there were no similar conflicts before this period. When the Aryans contacted the pre-Aryans, when the orthodox and the heterodox had to settle between each other social and political issues, and when the Buddhists, the Jainas and the followers of the Brahmanical religion contested for religious supremacy and for royal and imperial preference, there were conflicts. But these conflicts only helped to give a final shape to Hinduism, as it is now called. No Hindu called himself a Hindu before the Muslim conquests. By religion he was a follower of Arya Dharma or the Way of Life of the Aryans; when asked for further details, he would say that he was a follower of Buddha, Jina or the Vedas; by caste he was a Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaisya or Sudra and by sect he was a Saiva, Vaishnava or Smarta. But no member of any of these groups thought that he was living with aliens, who might exterminate him any moment. The peculiar unification produced by the Puranic culture, which tried to place one sect or god over every other sect or god, and yet treated the other gods as inferior manifestations of the same divinity but worthy of worship, produced in every person a sense of social and so of cultural affinity and unity, the weakness of which was betrayed only during the conflict with Islam. All pre-Islamic cultural conflicts in India served to broaden the conception of religion as a spiritual quest, and made the Hindu society more and more comprehensive by creating more and more places for castes and sub-castes. For instance, the conflict between Buddhism and Brahmanism produced the non-theistic spiritual monism of Gaudapada and Sankara and resulted in the introduction of a new god into the Hindu pantheon, namely, Buddha as an incarnation of Vishnu. Similarly, the conflict between Jainism and Brahmanism resulted in the introduction of vegetarianism and a new emphasis on the

mokshasastra or the science of salvation. What is usually called Indian Philosophy, including the philosophical systems of Buddhism, Jainism and the orthodox schools, deals with problems concerned with the highest value, namely, *moksha*. All the *darsanasastras* or sciences of the views (of reality) are also *mokshasastras* or sciences of (the problems of) *moksha* or salvation. The scope for the development of philosophy at the level of the highest value was given by the peculiar nature of the Indian religious attitude, which was rational and psychological, but not dogmatic and authoritarian. Hence the problems of reason (logic) and psychology had to be raised in that peculiar religious context and attempts were made to solve them again in the same context. The Greeks, for instance, raised the same problems in the context of social investigations; while the tendency of many contemporary philosophers is to raise the same problems with a materialistic, positivistic or naturalistic attitude. That is why Western critics in the beginning of the twentieth century found no ethics as such in Indian Philosophy. They forgot that the interest of Indian Philosophy was not in founding a stable society, but in pointing to man his truest nature and highest ideal of life, which is salvation. It is useless to criticize Indian Philosophy for not being what it never aimed to be. On the contrary, it was true to its aim. The right criticism of the critics could have been that the sciences of duty or *dharmastras* did not develop into philosophies but remained at the level of codes. Had they developed into systems of ethical philosophy, then the question of the relation of their theories with the theories of *moksha* would not have been ignored. In fact, the sciences dealing with the first three ideals of life did not develop into philosophies, except for stray theorizings; and hence the question of inter relating those theories with those that arose in connexion with discussions relevant to the problems of *moksha* did not arise. Otherwise, Indian philosophers could have produced encyclopaedic surveys of the sciences of life, mundane supra-mundane. Still, the highest possible philosophical edifices were built, so far as the fourth ideal of life was concerned.

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ideal of *ahimsa* (non-injury). Hindu culture and its ideals remained plastic and expansive and put on more and more new forms. So the conflicts had to be described as inner and not as outer. Invaders from Central Asia did not enter India with rigid religious dogmas and with a sense of cultural superiority. Those were the times when culture was centred in religion and religion identified itself with all kinds of cultural forms in most societies; and so religious superiority was equated to cultural superiority. Yet as the religions of India and Central Asia did not crystallize into rigid dogmas and creeds, they were still plastic, receptive and considerate. But with the advent of Islam, cultural conflicts assumed a new form in India.

The Gupta Empire ended towards the close of the 6th century, though the Guptas continued to rule small kingdoms up to the 8th, when the first Muslim invasion of India occurred and her political degeneration started. The Heroic Age of India began to decline and the Age of Communalism to dawn; or rather, the latter was superimposed on the former. The Hindu conducted the battles with the heroic ideal in view. Peoples were not exterminated; and defeated kings, according to the Arya Dharma, were reinstated if they acknowledged the conquerors. That is why Mohammad Ghorî, though defeated and captured, was set at liberty by Prithvi Raj. But the Muslim ideals in war and politics were different. In Islam the religious and secular head was one. Hence political conquest had to be religious conquest and therefore cultural conquest. In practice, the conquered culture like the conquered religions were to be exterminated, as culture and religion were much more closely associated then than now. Though it is possible to interpret the Koran differently as it is done by progressive Muslims by emphasizing more reasonable passages, again in practice Muslim secular heads found it more convenient to ignore them and proclaim every war with non-Muslims a holy war (*Jihad*). Thus the spread of Muslim political power meant also the spread of Islam and the disappearance of non-Islamic religions and cultures, wherever they were weak. The extermination of Kafir

(non-Muslim) populations and the appropriation of their wealth and women were followed with religious zeal. Some Christian observers like Havell write. "In theory, at least, all men within the fold of Islam were equal. The reward of the faithful was an unbounded enjoyment of the present life and Paradise hereafter, and a part of this reward was the right to rule over all who were not of the fold so that they too might increase the happiness and wealth of the elect. The rules of conduct which regulated Musalman society did not necessarily apply to the treatment of non-Muslims. Such rights as the latter, individually or collectively, might possess were of the nature of benevolences contingent upon their good behaviour and the will of God, represented by the sword of Islam⁴⁹." Islamic society has the strongest communal bias, based indeed on religion and not on race.

The conflict between Islam and Hinduism forms a very interesting study for the student of society. First, Islam, like the other Semitic religion, Judaism, had a tribal origin and importance. Though, unlike the other, it broke its tribal barriers in the attempt to become universal, it became peculiarly communalistic. But Hinduism had its origins in the worship of the natural forces and the Inner Spirit of man, which resulted in a peculiar type of rationalism and psychological discipline for spiritual sublimation. In the second place, the secular and religious head was the same for Islam; and public support to the king was the stronger the more the recognition he got as a spiritual head also. But for Hinduism, the two were different. It was a disqualification for the spiritual head to take interest in secular affairs. Even Janaka and Ajatasatru, who reached the greatest heights in spiritual development, never claimed and aspired for spiritual headship, and gave that honour and responsibility to their preceptors, whom they worshipped. In the third place, because of the identification of temporal and spiritual heads in Islam, the Muslim would interpret his serving a non-Muslim ruler as following a non-Islamic spiritual head; and he

49. *Arjan Rats in India*, p. 404.

had a bias, fostered by his religion, against being a subject of a non-Muslim state, though, it has to be added, there is a change in this attitude among some of contemporary educated Muslims. But it was very strong in the minds of the Muslims who first came into contact with the Hindus, and can still successfully be appealed to if sufficient temptations are offered. But the Hindu had no objection to being a subject of any religious state, provided he and his family were not molested for their religion. This attitude of his was again a consequence of the separation of the secular and spiritual headships in Hinduism. Though the whole of India was Hindu at that time, its being a political unity was not so clearly conceived as its being a social and cultural unity. The ideal of the *samrat* or the king of kings was present before the minds of many great monarchs; but it was followed more for heroic recognition than for imposing political unity on the country. Further, effective political unity, in those days of lack of proper communications, was impossible. Hindu social structure was given a religious sanction; but politics did not enter it. The Hindu was prepared to serve whichever ruler allowed him to follow his religion. The person who had the right to outcaste and impose ostracization was the religious head and not the secular. In the fourth place, war between a Muslim king and a Hindu was, for the Muslims, a war between two communities; and the object of the war, according to them, was the extermination of the rival religion and culture not merely its king. The end was achieved both by killing the members of the rival community and by converting them. But for the Hindu, the object of the war was the extermination of the rival king, not the rival community. Because of the polymorphous nature of his own society, he would admit the Muslims to live as another caste within the Hindu fold for all practical purposes. In the fifth place, Islam had a definite creed and set of dogmas; while Hinduism was rational and psychological and had no special creed and dogmas. The former was rigid, unaccommodating, and inexpressive, so far as its spiritual concepts were concerned; but the latter was

plastic, accomodating and expansive on its spiritual side. This is the result again of Islam having a book and Hinduism having nothing corresponding to it. It could never have said what Caliph Omar is alleged to have said: All the other books say either what our book says or what our book does not say; in the former case, they are unnecessary and, in the latter, untrue; and so in either case, they may safely be destroyed. In the sixth place, Islam is proselytizing and expansive socially and physically, that is, as an institution with a physical form; while Hinduism, whatever be the reasons, became non proselytizing and physically inexpansive. Converts from Hinduism to Islam were lost by Hinduism for ever. Quite often, this aspect of making and taking converts into its fold is extolled as a religion's being universal. But almost every proselytizing religion has been intolerant of other religions and, in this sense, particularist and not universal.

The result of the conflict between Hinduism and Islam were not favourable to the former. Hinduism did not take converts, nor could it be intolerant. Conflicts at the philosophical and psychological level, at which Hinduism could have shown its strength and produced beneficial effects on Islam, were generally meaningless for the latter, which consistently discouraged them; and for Hinduism, similar discussions were meaningless at the political and social level, though they were forced upon it. Hinduism was unprepared for them and so was thrown into defense. Islam did not encourage logical and psychological discussions of religious problems and dogmas and looked upon such discussions with suspicion; and it was aggressive on the social and political side. Hinduism encouraged discussions of religious problems, but discouraged a logical and psychological approach to social and political problems and could not be aggressive on either side. Thus Hinduism showed its weakness and lost at the physical, social and political level. The social solidarity shown by Islam as a communal unit was lacking in Hinduism, as its castes were knit together loosely. The lowest castes, who were initiated into the spiritual truths

of Hinduism only symbolically and were therefore not fully aware of their importance, were the earliest and the easiest to be converted. As against a determinate particularist religion, Hinduism could present only its determinate social structure by strengthening and making its caste system more rigid. It was thus thrown on the defensive. It tried to entrench and assert itself in the South during the period of the Vizianagar Kingdom (13th to the 16th century), and again during the rise of the Maratha power, which spread over the whole of India. But it asserted itself in the old forms except for some new tactics adopted from the enemy. However, by the time the Maratha Empire could be consolidated, the British and West entered the scene.

As Islam did not give any chance for conflict at the philosophical level but always took a dogmatic authoritarian attitude, its influence on Indian philosophical and religious thought has been little or nothing. On the other hand, the Persian Sufi trends of Islam found a sympathetic echo in the Upanishadic philosophy; and Sufism would have become popular with the Indian Muslims but for the fanaticism of the Sunnis. Had Sufism and Shiism succeeded in India, there would perhaps have been a chance for a harmonious integration of Indian society, including both the Hindus and the Muslims. However, the three important Sufi sects of India, the Chisti, the Naqshbundi and the Quadiriyya, show some affinity with Hindu religious culture and emphasize some logical and psychological aspects of religious discipline. According to the first, the state of mind in which the finite soul is at one with God can be produced by music; but according to the second, the feeling of divine love cannot be and should not be produced by music, which is prohibited by Islam; the third takes a middle course and prohibits only such music as stirs the lower animal passions in man.⁵⁰

Music has remained an eternal and unremovable source of conflict between Islam and Hinduism. The Islamic conception of music and other fine arts is that they are a pastime and a source of low pleasure. Music is supposed to appeal to our lower nature alone; and as divine reality cannot be imagined, it would be a sacrilege to depict it in painting and sculpture. But the Indian classical conception of fine arts was different. Almost every art and science was a *vedāṅga* or a subsidiary of the Vedas. Correspondingly, the subject matter and practice prescribed by each work were meant to enhance spiritual inwardness aimed at by the Upanishads. Music was regarded as the worship of the Nadabrahman or the Brahman (Absolute) in the form of Nada (Sound, Word), in other words, the Logos. It is the elaboration of the affective emotive aspect of the Logos as Sound, which resides deep within every man. Indian musicians are not ignorant of low types of music; but all admit that the highest music should be the same as the worship of the Nadabrahman, and some of them, particularly in South India, where Hindu music is still preserved in its purest forms, even refuse to sing low types of music. It is with this idea that music and dance were encouraged within temples, though quite often the spirit behind the practice has been forgotten.

Thus when the Hindu was forbidden to play music in his temple, the prohibition amounted for him to prevention of spiritual realization. For the Muslim it was just the opposite; and he was not prepared to argue about the philosophical and psychological aspects of the question. Hence the conflict remained insoluble and had to be solved often only with the help of the police and the military. Similarly, in the case of idol worship, the Muslim was uncompromising and dogmatic. He was not prepared to see that for the Hindu the idol was only a symbol and that if one symbol was destroyed, another could replace it, and therefore to realize that the Hindu did not deliberately worship wood and stone. For the Hindu, all forms of worship and all forms of sculpture and other fine arts were different

techniques for the sublimation and inwardization of personality, so that it could become pure and reflect the divinity within.

There are indeed a few unsuccessful exceptions, on the Muslim side, who wanted a rational reconciliation. The first is the immature example of Akbar, the second the tragic attempt of Dara, and the third the attempt of some Nababs of Golconda almost towards the end of their reign, which was put an end to by the fanatical Aurangzeb. Though Islam contributed nothing to Indian thought and spirituality, it had its effects on external cult and society. Many of the Hindus, particularly in North India, adopted the veiling of women and the purdah system from the Muslims. Some Saivas of South India, called Vira-saivas or Heroic Saivas, adopted the aggressive practice of religious persecution from Islam and slaughtered some Jainas. The Muslim creed of exterminating the unbelievers is diametrically opposed to the Jaina creed of *ahimsa* or non-injury; and likewise the Jaina doctrine of *syadvada* or conditional predication of existence to the Muslim religious particularism. But curiously enough, the Vira-saivas, while adopting religious aggressiveness and particularity from the Muslims, remained most of them vegetarian. The Sthanikavasis also, who form a branch of the Svetambara sect of Jainism, gave up idol worship but did not adopt the aggressive communal practices of Islam. The Heroic Saivism in its turn gave rise to Heroic Vaishnavism (Vira vaishnavism) again in the South; for in that part of India the Saivas were not only the rivals of the Jainas but also of the Vaishnavas. In the North again, Sikhism, the religion of Guru Nanak, was a synthesis of Hindu and Islamic mono theisms. Though Sikhism was at first a pacifist religion, constant persecution by Islam turned its followers into a militaristic and heroic group.

The speaker, though himself is not well-acquainted with Urdu literature, has been told by authorities on the subject that in almost all Muslim courts, poetry was a diversion, pastime, and pleasure, like other fine arts. The high ideals of Indian poetry and fine arts therefore degenerated into acknowledged low ideals of sensu-

ous pleasure in the courts of Muslim rulers. The poetry of the Sufi mystics and of syncretists like Kabir did not belong to royal courts. And as it was the courts that set the fashion, especially in those times, it has to be said that literature and other fine arts lost their spiritual depth.

Architectural patterns and music, particularly in the North, underwent certain modifications through the influence of Persian forms, which the Muslims introduced. But the dominant patterns remained Hindu or Aryan. Havell says that Muslim architecture is a "graft upon the old Hindu stock and not an exotic transplantation from Arabia to Indian soil" ²¹.

The Advent of Islam showed the weakness of the Hindu social and political organization. Whatever be the spiritual ideals that tacitly or overtly guided its formation and however high they be, social and political conflicts occur at the physical level; and the amount of social solidarity needed for withstanding such external attacks and absorbing their shock was lacking in India. The result was that Islam introduced a new rift within Indian society. Earlier the different groups were living peacefully together as castes and sub castes, acknowledging the spiritual supremacy of the Brahmin and the temporal supremacy of the ruling class. But the Muslim would not acknowledge either. Hence the earlier communal unity was disturbed. Though in the early stages of contact most of the Muslims took to the profession of arms, which belonged to the Hindu Kshatriya, later many had to take to professions overlapping the traditional professions of other castes and sub-castes. Thus two societies with overlapping functions had to run their life. The result naturally would be the rise and intensification of the doubt about the necessity of the relation between castes and their traditional professions.

The Muslim period of Indian history is, on the whole, a period of constant communal conflicts, wars and unrest. Except for some

huge edifices built by kings and emperors, there was very little cultural progress. The emperors of Vizianagar did much for Indian culture (1300 to 1600), but mostly in defense. They invited many scholars who fled from the North. Because of the systematic destruction of libraries, universities and temples by Muslims, scholars had to bury their books underground and leave them to the mercy of white ants and other insects. Quite often they were themselves killed and their books forgotten. By about the 13th century, the meaning of the Vedas was almost forgotten like the meaning of Sanscrit works in the island of Bali; and Sayana and Madhava, the famous ministers of Vizianagar, had to collect pandits from different parts of the country and prepare explanatory commentaries on the Vedas. But Vizianagar itself was a city that was for many purposes a military camp, constantly threatened by Muslim attacks from outside and disruption from within, the latter due to the old idea, that government and rule belonged to the ruling class only and not to the people, still swaying the minds of men and giving scope for the ruling classes to fight among themselves for power, unmindful of the consequences to their constantly threatened society. That it was no longer the Heroic Age of the early Aryans but the Age of Communalism was not fully recognized by the ruling Hindus, while the Muslim conquerors realized it fully and made the fullest possible use of their realization. They placed before their soldiers the ideal of the extermination of the largest possible number of infidels, by proclaiming every war to be a holy war. From the economic and people's point of view, these wars could have brought nothing but distress and misery to the Hindus and Muslims on both sides; and only a few persons at the top might have been benefited. But we should not forget that those wars were fought by the Muslims in the name of Islam, that while the soldier was tempted by loot, his enthusiasm was roused by appeals to communalism and the promise of heaven for destroying the unbeliever. That these sentiments are strong living forces even now is shown by the recent communal riots and orgies in Bengal and the Punjab.

While the Hindus did not realize the new set up of the Communal Age, the Muslims as a community regarded themselves as the rulers, whoever be the people ruled. The ruled did not enter their thought except as means to their ends. The rulers were a moving force ; if they could not rule here, they would rule somewhere else. Stability involved the danger of constant attacks and wearing out. After the fall of the Vizianagar Empire, the Marathas understood the situation and established moving armies of cavalry, which would not give open pitched battles and which did not depend on a single main stronghold like Vizianagar. Then the tables were turned and the Hindus began to make repeated attacks on established kingdoms of Muslims. But the sufferers in this case also were the people. And as the Marathas were always on the march, they had little time to devote to the defence or advancement of culture. In fact, we are told that Peshwa Madhorao was given a definite advice in that direction. That is why, though the Vizianagar Empire was smaller than the Maratha Empire, it could do much more for Hindu culture than the latter.

A consequence of the constantly moving armies, battles and wars was that India had no respite to think. Peace followed the advent of the British ; the chronic communal conflicts were forcibly put an end to; and India again obtained an opportunity to reflect and take stock of its achievements and failures. Buddhism suffered more terribly than Hinduism at the hands of the Muslims, who destroyed its universities and slaughtered its peaceful monks. Jainism obtained protection from the rulers of Rajasthan and the kings of Mysore ; but Buddhism was not similarly fortunate, and after the fall of the Vizianagar Empire, disappeared from India as a living religion, except for a few remnants in Bengal and the Himalayan regions. In face of the communal problem imposed on the Indian society by Islam, the problem of Hindu orthodoxy versus heterodoxy became unimportant.

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Though the British rulers did not interfere with the local religions, they found it advantageous not to kill communalism by force, which they could have done, not in the name of Christianity, but in the name of science and reason; and kept it alive, following the maxim, "divide and rule", as consistently as possible, so far as it did not weaken their effective grip on the country by making either community too strong for them. And where communal antagonisms were not strong as in Madras, they introduced caste rivalries. This practice not only kindled old animosities but also created new ones, with the result that Indian society was made to appear as more and more disintegrated, creating serious problems for solution, which the British, in the name of religious neutrality, abstained from solving. For had they, by force and persuasion imposed unity on Indian society, they would have lost their chances as rulers long ago. Political unity was achieved; but even the ancient Hindu social unity was further weakened.

At the same time Christian missionary activities were indirectly encouraged; for psychologically it was advantageous to the rulers to produce admiration for their religion and culture in the minds of their subjects. As forcible conversions were not permitted, the missionaries had to have recourse to persuasion and argument. And there they came into unexpected logical contest with Indian Philosophy; which they found necessary to study in order to refute.

The main target of attack for the Christian missionaries was the Hindu caste system, idol worship, the position of women in both Hindu and Muslim societies, and certain traditional practices like child marriages, compulsory widowhood, *suttee* and lack of divorce. Educational backwardness of the lower classes and absence of medical relief throughout the country—which was due to the lack of settled conditions—also gave good scope for the humanitarian activities of the missions, which could get sufficient financial assistance from their mother countries and which interpreted all the above defects as due to the absence of

It will be difficult for us to maintain that just as Islam tried to put an end to the Heroic Age of ancient India, politically and socially, and started the Age of Communalism, the British tried to put an end to the Age of Communalism and started the Economic Age; for such an interpretation of India's cultural history would be contradicted by the recent communal killings on large scale. The Hindu is on the whole eager to leave the Age of Communalism behind; but the Muslims have shown that they are not over-anxious about it. We shall therefore be nearer the truth if we say that the Economic Age was super-imposed upon the Heroic and the Communal and that as the second is disappearing, we are still passing through both the other two, though there is hope that the Indian Union, by consistently working out its secular political ideal, might be able to shed communalism.

The Europeans came to India, neither for converts nor for conquest, but for trade and profit. It was the peculiar political conditions in India that made them her rulers. But with them came Christianity also. The Portuguese at first tried forcible conversion. But the Hindu had had too much of it and the Muslims were intolerant of it; hence the Portuguese failed to achieve their object even as traders. But the British were prudent observers of the situation, and therefore promised not to interfere with local religions. Yet Christianity was a proselytizing religion, and with the British came Christian missionaries. So while economic exploitation was carried on by the rulers, the missionaries did their work of conversion by peaceful means and persuasion. Then, again, along with Christianity, not indeed as its necessary accompaniment, entered Western scientific, political and social education. The advent of the British thus meant a complicated challenge to Indian society, which had not yet solved its own communal conflicts either socially or politically. It was a meeting of self-conscious East and self-conscious West, each with its own defects and merits.

Islam, due to the unsettled conditions and precarious existence of kingdoms, the rulers were not in a position to make those grants. However, when Christianity entered India, it could present its humanitarian form as humanism in opposition to the existing local religions. It interpreted and represented the status of Indian women and the conditions of lower castes etc., as due to the Indian religions being unhumanistic and Indian Philosophy being unethical.

It may not be unnecessary to remind ourselves that Hinduism baffles all attempts at definition. Unlike Christianity, it is not founded by a single person. It is a natural growth of the expression of the spiritual and retains most of the features of that growth. Its basic doctrine is the spirituality of man, and it upholds the realization of the Inner Spirit as the highest aim of life. It encourages every form of cult and worship, provided that form aligns itself with the basic spiritual truth. Hence it need not and does not destroy any other religion. Hence also its declaration that all religions are one and its proverbial and incomprehensible tolerance. This attitude resulted in retaining several forms of worship, though they are reinterpreted in terms of the spiritual by treating the idol as a symbol of the Divine and the form of its worship as symbolizing God-realization. Thus inwardness was conferred upon the most crude cults. But the external forms remained and their significance was missed by many of its followers. It should be said that most of the forms that were indecent and cruel were condemned and prohibited, and Sankara in the 8th century gave a list of prohibited forms. Even now people are legally outcasted for following them, though the general tendency is not to bother about them so far as they are not too unsocial. Anyway, Hinduism can accommodate all social and religious forms, provided they do not deny the truth of the Inner Spirit and do not attempt to destroy Hinduism itself. Hence the Hindu did not close his ears to the preachings of the Christian missions; and as he thought about them, he could not see why their ideas and the reforms which they suggested should not be introduced into

humanism in Indian Philosophy and religion, claiming that the needed humanism was present in Christianity. They started educational institutions and established hospitals, thereby impressing on the people the new aspect of their monastic orders, which were more directly useful to society than the pure spiritual ideals of Eastern monasticism in general.

In the missionary criticisms and activities are involved a number of problems of interest for philosophy of life and culture. Islam did not permit any argument about its religious and social traditions. But the Hindu welcomed them. So far as the lower castes, which did not have the benefit of the higher Hindu philosophical culture, were concerned, many of them adopted Islam as in Bengal. But the higher castes not only welcomed discussion of philosophical problems but also took full advantage of the educational institutions started by the missions. Thus the missions helped the spread of new rational and humanistic ideas among the higher castes, which were the first to recognize the artificiality of caste distinctions when the original colour distinctions were waning; and though the missions did not get many converts to their faith, the Christian teachers got many for their ideas, the importance of which was fully appreciated particularly by the Hindus who were the first to take to English education.

Though Christianity is as other-worldly as Hinduism, its peculiar origin in the atmosphere of Judaism, which was a tribal religion, and its spread and development in the atmosphere of Greek religion and philosophy both in the ancient times and after the Renaissance, gave it a humanistic and rational turn. It is too well-known that Western science did not grow under the auspices and because of Christianity, but in spite of it. Islam too has an element of humanism in its communalism. If the Christian missions in Europe took over education and medical work by obtaining a tithe from the kings, ancient Indian laws demanded that one sixth of the revenues should be spent by kings on similar activities; though after the advent of

themselves to their ancient philosophy and literature, which many with western education were about to ignore at that time.

The result was a revival of ancient learning in the light of Western criticisms. This was the period of the Indian Renaissance, which was a product of East-West cultural conflict. The leading thinkers of India were able to realize, in comparison with Western culture in general, the great spiritual depths Indian culture and philosophy reached; but the same comparison made some of them realize also the one-sidedness of that development, and also that certain of its aspects had only local and temporal significance and could not be valid for all times, though the deepest truths of the same culture might be of universal and eternal validity. In other words, human and humanistic interests were unduly under-emphasized and, in popular philosophy, were not only disregarded but also condemned.

The realization that our ancient culture was one-sided in some of its emphases led to a number of reform movements. Knowledge of past glories made the Indian self-conscious; and he began to feel that at least in spiritual achievements he, as a representative of the Indian nation, could justly feel superior to some of the representative of the West, with whom he had to deal as a subordinate and a subject. India's national consciousness began to evolve. But national leaders at first found that the intense inwardness attained by the Indian mind prevented the Indian from being adequately responsive to the nationalist appeal. In other words, the response to humanistic appeal was not strong enough. It would be strong enough if, for the sake of this life and society, it were universally spontaneous to appeals to action. B. G. Tilak therefore sought to remedy the one-sided inwardness. After the rise, fall and assimilation of Buddhism, primary emphasis was laid on renunciation (*śamnyasa*) associated with *jñanmarga* (way of gnosis). But the early Aryans, it may be said with justification, laid the same emphasis on *karmamarga* (way of action) both before and after they came

Hinduism, without at the same time himself giving it up and turning Christian. Besides, there was one thing which no other religion in the world could give him better, namely, the intense joy which the realization of God or the union with the Inner Spirit would produce, which other religions promised him in the next world but Hinduism promised him in this world and in this body, provided he underwent the necessary spiritual discipline. This he felt was an actuality in experience which no argument and no insinuation or gibe could dissuade him from believing in. Wordsworth's *Ode to Immortality* had a special appeal to him, by reflecting his own feelings on the question. In order not to lose the precious discovery of his ancients, the Hindu wanted to retain his Hinduism and make up its defects by introducing into it social and religious reforms.

The Hindu therefore appreciated the cultural challenge offered by Christianity and in right earnest took to Western education given by the missions. The rulers also were interested in giving English education to the Indians, first in order to have good clerks and subordinate officers and then to train them in methods of democracy. Further, Lord Macaulay had a low opinion of the traditional Indian methods of education and became the author of the compulsory introduction of Western methods, with the result that the Indians got acquainted not only with English literature but also with English political ideas and parliamentary forms. As a result India's political and national consciousness awoke.

For India's cultural and intellectual progress, contact with the British has been more important than with Islam. In pursuance of their policy not to interfere with the local religions of the people and with their social practices, the rulers found it necessary to understand them. The Asiatic Society of Bengal was founded by Sir William Jones in the year 1784. At first our moral codes and later our literary and philosophical works were translated. The high praise bestowed on India's philosophical and literary genius by Goethe, the Schlegels, Max Müller, Deussen and several others turned the minds of the Indians

themselves to their ancient philosophy and literature, which many with western education were about to ignore at that time.

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to realize that the highest Truth was within and not without man. In the Brahmanical reaction against Buddhism in the 8th century, one of the leaders, Kumarila, denounced *sannyasa* altogether and advocated return to the pure forms of Vedic *karma* (action), which meant sacrifices and a life of action. The values of this world were not to be spurned but to be earnestly sought after. When Sankara wanted to convince Kumarila that he was wrong in denouncing *sannyasa*, the story goes, the latter was about to die and directed the former to go to Mandana, his disciple. Sannyasins were so much despised by the Vedic followers then that they were not allowed to be present at ancestral ceremonies; and Sankara's appearance at such a moment in Mandana's house threw the gathering into confusion. However, Sankara defeated Mandana in discussion and made him his disciple. This incident, even if it is not historically true, is highly indicative of the difference between the early Brahmanic and the Buddhist outlooks. Sankara, in spite of his incessant criticisms of Buddhism, was called by his rivals a Buddhist in disguise (*prasechanna buddha*). Yet his was the only way of incorporating and assimilating all that was best in Buddhism and deprive it of any *raison d'être* for separate existence. And Sankara was treated as the *smarta* (orthodox, according to the *smritis*) interpreter of the Upanishads, the *Brahmasutras* and the *Bhagavadgita*, which constitute the basic triad of the Vedanta philosophy; whereas even Ramanuja and Madhva were treated as sectarian; the difference between the two being that the *smarta* interpreters accept only the Vedas as the final authority, while the others give the same and even a higher place to their respective Agamas. This recognition of Sankara shows how even orthodoxy could finally be made to yield an interpretation in accordance with the ideal of Buddhist monasticism.

According to Ramanuja, Madhva and some other sectarian Vedantins, *bhaktimarga* or the way of devotion to God was the highest of the paths. But whether it was *bhaktimarga* or *jnanamarga*, the tendency to run down *karmamarga* gained strength. But after the rise of nationalism, when India felt the

need for strong and sincere political activity, its leaders realized that they were handicapped by the attitude to the world the traditional religion and philosophy of life engendered in the minds of many. Tilak therefore wrote a new commentary on the *Gita*, which is the Bible for India's millions, in order to revive *karmamarga*. Indeed, if Krishna exhorted Arjuna, who was dejected and wanted to lay down arms and retire to the forest, to act but not to renounce action, the *Gita* should be interpreted as laying the primary emphasis on *karmamarga* and not on the other two. Tilak is thus the earliest of the modern Indian thinkers to give a new turn to the general Indian philosophical attitude to the world; or in other words, to lay a new emphasis on the ancient humanistic and activist trend of Indian thought. The spirit behind Tilak's thought can be discerned in all the leading philosophers of contemporary India like Radhakrishnan, Tagore, Bhagvan Das and Aurobindo Ghosh.

The *Gita* holds a peculiar position in India's religious and philosophical literature. It is not only one of the orthodox triad (*prasthanatraya*), but also contains a peculiar combination of metaphysics and philosophy of life. As it is a part of the epic, *Mahabharata*, even the lower castes are allowed to read it and derive through it the Vedic teachings, the texts of which they are traditionally prevented from reading. This situation does not obtain now. It is the common scripture, for metaphysics and philosophy of life, of all irrespective of caste, the common philosophical link of all groups that constitute the Hindu fold. So most of the Indian leaders have made it a point to write commentaries on it. Mahatma Gandhi wrote one to preach his *ahimsa* (non-injury); and Radhakrishnan has written another in English to preach the way of detached action for the welfare of the world, *Ishtasangraha*, which is in consonance with the ideals of the Unesco

Even in ancient times, the weakening influence of one-sided inwardness on human nature was felt. A new type of cult called *virasadhana* (the cult of the hero) was invented: and the worship of Sakti or Mother-goddess was utilized generally in its

practice. Bengal was a home, for a long time, of the *tantric* worship of Sakti, the feminine aspect of Divinity, which, curiously enough, was identified often with the terrible destructive aspects of the universe. The worship therefore was attended with the slaughter of animals. Vegetarianism and the consequent abhorrence of bloodshed and sensitivity to it had no place in the cult. Further, the *sadhana* (practice) of the *saktas* (worshippers of Sakti) included visiting burial and cremation grounds and battle fields at the dead of night and similar practices condemned outright by orthodox Hinduism,—this is one of the sects outlawed by Sankara—, which naturally harden man mentally. Moreover, it was a practice of the warrior caste to worship some god or goddess in his or her terrible aspects in order to obtain the necessary psychological set up for battle. For instance, Sivaji worshipped the goddess Bhavani, and the Kakatiyas of Warrangal are said to have worshipped the goddess Kakati. The revolutionaries of Bengal, who wanted to drive away the British by force, revived and adopted this form of worship. Sri Anubindo once belonged to this group of revolutionaries; and even after his severance from practical politics, he did not give up the worship of the Mother.

As a result of contact with Western culture through the British, a number of significant changes and reforms took place in India, the leaders of which, however, were practically unanimous in accepting that ancient Indian culture and religion contained the highest spiritual truths, for which one need not go to other religions. These changes and reforms may be classified into political, religious, social and philosophical.

The germs of nationalism, though not precise, may be traced to early times. But nationalism in the definite modern form took shape due to, and in spite of British influence. It was due to the British, because they were the first to unite the whole of India for effective political administration and organization, without reference to social, communal, linguistic and other cultural considerations: that India should be a political unit was

an ideal given by them. And it took shape in spite of them, because the British bureaucracy was not eager that people should be united by that ideal. Along with the glorification of the country as a nation and a sort of her worship as that of personified Bharatamata or Mother India, the idea that India should be governed for the sake of the Indians and not the British took on particular importance. The principle that India is to be an economic unit was not at first so well visualized as that it should be governed for its own people and by her own people. Even this principle was complicated by another, namely, that India was to be a religious unit, which was the basis of the ideology of the Muslim League. However, in spite of these complications, that the lot of the Indian citizen as a human being has to be improved, that he should be made comfortable and happy here, and that he has therefore himself to fight against his political and economic subjection were accepted as the political aims of the Congress and the Muslim League, either implicitly or explicitly, and brought to the forefront a new philosophical ideal implicit in the general political outlook, namely, the importance of the human individual as both the end and means of political action. The law of *karma*, particularly as preached by the most orthodox of the orthodox systems, *Mimamsa*, presupposes the essential reality of the human being as the end and means of *karma* (action); and this idea was re-emphasized by Tilak in his philosophy of action, which he presented as a kind of Vedantic thought; for the *Gita* has become one of the authoritative triad of the Vedantic philosophers. Mahatma Gandhi did not claim to be a scholar and an academician, and did not present his ideas in terms of humanism or absolutism. Yet his philosophy of *satyagraha*, which involves an unyielding sticking to truth as one understands it, in spite of what society thinks or does gives primacy to the individuality of man; and his philosophy of political action and uplift of the masses and the poor in the spirit of the worship of God appearing as the needy (*Isidrahrayana*) equally involves the recognition of the value of the human individual. It is the human individual as such who is of value, not merely the Universal Spirit that resides in him.

Mahatma Gandhi formulated his political ideology in terms of religion, though he did not mean by religion any institutionalized religion, but only spirituality. By the time he contributed his essay to *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, he equated his God to Truth, which he said was really the God all religions. But the word religion revived ancient memories of communalism and so fanaticism and, in spite of Gandhi, what ought to have been a secular but spiritual nationalism, comprehending both Islam and Hinduism in a rationalized universal form, turned into the communal nationalism of the Muslim League with a theocratic ideology, and threatened to turn into a similar Hindu nationalism of the Hindu Mahasabha, which would have become an actuality had it not been for the strong action taken against the movement by the Congress in power. The Congress consistently followed the ideal of a secular but spiritual nationalism, in spite of constant provocations, imputations and insinuations by the Muslim League. By being secular in outlook, the Congress implicitly attaches greater value to the human individual as such than the Muslim League, which attaches the same to him so far as he is a member of the Muslim community and therefore subordinates him and his rights as a man by birth to the Islamic community and the theocratic state. And so the subordination of the individual to the state and so a kind of theocratic dictatorship have an emphasis in the ideology of the Muslim League, which is absent from the ideology of the Congress.

However, the secular but rationally and psychologically spiritual ideology of the Indian National Congress—this organization has been called the Indian National Congress and not the Hindu Congress right from its inception by Hume, though the Muslim League called it a Hindu organization—is complicated more in the Indian Union by communist and socialist ideals than in the theocratic Muslim State of Pakistan. As against the complete secularism and materialism of communism, Pakistan offers the ideology of theocracy; but the political secularism of India, as in many other countries, offers some common humanistic ground to communism and socialism. On the other hand,

when once the hard rind of theocratic irrationalism is broken by the socialist or communist rationalism, there would be nothing left to tone down the materialism of the latter and to transform it into something better and spiritual; while the spiritual basis of the secular nationalism of India, through its psychological and rational appeal, would transform communism or socialism into something spiritual and therefore very different. For spirituality is essentially individualistic: what is spiritual in man can be realized by himself alone. And the true foundation of democracy is respect for the individual and therefore the recognition that the individuality of the individual is not exhausted by his social relationships.

Both communism and democracy claim to be humanistic, and criticize each other for not being truly humanistic. The former claims that democracy, while professing to respect the dignity of the human individual, does not make it economically and so in practice possible for him to realize his full potentialities and human values. The latter points out that communism subordinates the individual to the community and in practice to the group in power, which identifies the interests of the community with its own, that dictatorship is inherent in communism and that therefore there can be no place in communist ideology for the value of the individual and individual initiative. As India has not yielded down, in spite of a constitution, to the acceptance of any hard crusted political ideology, its ideological forms are less rigid than those of Pakistan, which has accepted a precisely formed ideology of the Islamic theocratic state, in which, if a change is to come, it would come with violence and vengeance.

Contact with Christianity resulted in a number of religious reform movements. It is often difficult to dissociate social reform from the religious, because in most countries of the world social laws have still to have religious sanction. Unless they are orders or acts by the government, social reforms have been inextricably blended with the religious. Of the movements

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Both communism and democracy claim to be humanistic, and criticize each other for not being truly humanistic. The former claims that democracy, while professing to respect the dignity of the human individual, does not make it economically and so in practice possible for him to realize his full potentialities and human values. The latter points out that communism subordinates the individual to the community and in practice to the group in power, which identifies the interests of the community with its own, that dictatorship is inherent in communism and that therefore there can be no place in communist ideology for the value of the individual and individual initiative. As India has not yielded down, in spite of a constitution, to the acceptance of any hard crusted political ideology, its ideological forms are less rigid than those of Pakistan, which has accepted a precisely formed ideology of the Islamic theocratic state, in which, if a change is to come, it would come with violence and vengeance.

Contact with Christianity resulted in a number of religious reform movements. It is often difficult to dissociate social reform from the religious, because in most countries of the world social laws have still to have religious sanction. Unless they are orders or acts by the government, social reforms have been inextricably blended with the religious. Of the movements

that are rather religious than social, the most important is the Ramakrishna Mission, started by the great Swami Vivekananda, a disciple of the saint, Ramakrishna. It should be said to the credit of Swami Vivekananda that, though he was a Sudra, he disapproved of meaningless social reforms, some of the leaders of which ignored the spirit behind the caste system. The high ideals of Brahminhood, though not consistently followed by the members of that caste, were indeed true and noble. So though Vivekananda admitted into the monastic order men and women of all castes and races, he claimed himself to be a follower of Sankara. He could see no cause for danger to Hindu spirituality if the traditional social structure was changed and there were inter-marriages between different castes and communities. Such reforms could be introduced without creating new castes and divisions. Another great reform, from the humanistic point of view, which he introduced into the monastic order was compulsory social service, which he called the worship of *daridranarayana* (God in the guise of the needy). Though the communists and socialists would call this philanthropy and not humanism, at the time when Vivekananda introduced it, it was a new idea for the Indians, because the Indian *sannyasins* (monks), according to traditional rules, were prohibited from taking interest in society: a *sannyasin* is one who renounces everything, family, wealth and society. It should indeed be noted that one of the greatest men India produced, Swami Vidyaranya, took great interest in the Kingdom of Vizianagar and Swami Ramadas likewise in the activities of Sivaji. But they were rare exceptions and belonged to some of the most troublous times.

While subtly influencing Hinduism, Christianity itself, like Islam, underwent some transformation. Christianity, as preached by Western missionaries in India, did not satisfy the Indian thirst for spiritual realization, for it looked like nothing more than social service. The essence of spirituality does not lie in any social ethic, however good it may be, but in union with God and the bliss of that union. Sachu Sundar Singh and the Christian Aśramas, particularly in the South, give a clue as to the form the Indian would like Christianity to assume.

Mr. Agnihotri founded Devasamaj in Lahore. It was at first theistic, but later became a kind of spiritual atheism. It was more influenced by Western scientific ideas than by Christianity. The Satguru of the Radhaswamis was founded by Sri Tulsi Ram in Agra. Spiritually, it was a re-emphasis on a psychological technique of ancient yoga; and socially, it took up industrialization as part of its programme. The latter was a novelty to Indian religion. It aimed at pointing out that interest in worldly affairs was not detrimental to spiritual progress.

The Theosophical Society started by Mrs. Annie Besant did not aim directly at social reform, though Mrs. Besant took part in political activity and was incarcerated by the British. The Society took seriously the Hindu idea that all religions are essentially one and created an institution to embody it. This encouraged liberal outlook and inter-caste, inter-communal and inter-racial marriages. The society did much for education also. And the greatest service which Mrs. Besant did to India was to make the Indian proud of his spiritual heritage. She pointed out to him that there was nothing spiritual in other religions which Hinduism did not contain. The resulting self-consciousness helped the Indian Renaissance and strengthened upsurging nationalism.

Of the movements that aimed more at social reform than the religious, the Brahmosamaj, the Aryasamaj and the Prarthanasamaj should be mentioned. The Brahmosamaj was founded by Raja Rammohan Roy, who was influenced both by Islam and Christianity and preached against polytheism and idolatry. But the greatest service he did to India was on the social side. To him India owes the abolition of *suttee* and the re-introduction, among the higher castes, of the re-marriage of widows. After him, the idea that woman is not a mere appendix to man but a personality by herself gained strength and is now stronger among some of the educated classes of India than even in England.

The Aryasamaj was founded by Swami Dayanand. He also rejected idolatry. He further preached: "Back to the Vedas". The early Aryans either directly worshipped natural forces or the Spirit within man. He would say therefore that they not only did not worship idols but also had no need of temples or mosques. And the Aryan society at the time of the Vedas had neither *suttee* nor compulsory life-long widowhood nor a rigid caste system. It was left to the choice of the woman concerned to marry or not to marry after the husband's death. Similarly the individual was assigned to a caste by merit and not by birth. The present social injustices, deformities and malpractices, he said, were later accretions, which ought to be discarded. Again, he argued, if Hinduism of the Vedic times took converts, why should it not do so now? So he started conversion. He thus re-emphasized the value of the human individual as against the supremacy of caste and tradition.

The Prarthanasamaj was founded by Dr. Atmaram Pandurang in Bombay. Its aim and programme were practically the same as those of the Brahmosamaj.

No social, religious or political ferment would leave the philosophy of a country unaffected. This phenomenon is happening in India, though it is not clearly discerned. First, as a result of the introduction of Western education, no student of philosophy in India is ignorant of Western philosophy, which has become practically the standard of rationality for him. Secondly, the Indian Renaissance has produced in him an admiration for the ancient Indian philosophers, whom he has tried to interpret to himself and to others in terms of western philosophical concepts. In the third place, western oriental scholarship, through both criticism and praise, has made him study his ancient philosophy seriously and answer the critics in their own terms and understand rationally where its superiority lies. This reinterpretation has enabled him to detect where the links in the chain of argument and the steps in the development of the philosophy are missing. Fourthly, western scientific thought,

elaborating its own logic, has begun influencing Indian philosophers. Fifthly, western scientific concepts, particularly evolution, have been found irrefutable by many. Sixthly, the criticism of western religious leaders that Indian thought is not sufficiently humanistic and this-worldly but too absolutistic and other-worldly has led many to re-estimate Indian thought. In the seventh place, the communist and socialist ideologies, though their success in drawing the attention of the Indian philosophers is not appreciable, have created a new philosophical ferment, emphasizing that man should be the centre of philosophy. We can discern one or more of these influences in the writings of the leading philosophers of contemporary India, like Radhakrishnan, Tagore, Aurobindo Ghosh, and Bhagavan Das.

Radhakrishnan refers in some places of his writings to the dawning of a new humanism in the world, which he has not yet analysed systematically and incorporated into his own philosophy. Even apart from this significant observation of his, there is an important line of his thought admitting the inevitable humanization of the Absolute. God for him is the Absolute humanized, pressed into the moulds of human thought. Nothing can thus escape being pressed into human thought and logic. Even for Tagore, God, as the Supreme Personality, is the Absolute humanized; and as we cannot think of the Absolute without humanizing it and understanding it according to our thought forms, we can have no interest in the pure Absolute, which we cannot understand. Our interest lies more in the painting than in the blank canvas on which it is done. Both Aurobindo and Bhagavan Das want to include the world of human values and matter in their Absolute. Though absolutism is the common philosophy of all, a new emphasis is being laid on the world of man and matter and a new affirmative attitude is being adopted to it. These philosophers, though absolutists, clear the way for a new kind of humanism in India, which Radhakrishnan observes dawning throughout the world.

If we add to these philosophical transformations the humanism underlying the communist and socialist ideologies and if both would influence each other, as such currents often do in both theoretical and practical spheres, we have to interpret all these movements together as the humanistic transformation of the basic ideology of our culture. If this transformation is rightly guided, our traditional values would be preserved intact and the condition of man on earth in India would be improved as a result. Philosophy of the future will not be merely religious or spiritual, concerned only with the psychological theories of God-realisation, the metaphysical theories of the proofs for the existence of God and of the nature of God and his relation to the world of matter and individuals, but also with the nature of the mutual relations between the individuals and between the individuals on the one side and the different forms of the material world on the other. It would include the philosophy of all the four values, *artha*, *kama*, *dharma* and *moksha* (wealth, love, duty and salvation) in one comprehensive system of thought and would therefore be wider in scope, being obliged to include a larger number of topics than our ancient philosophers did by convention or by following the traditional division of values into the four classes and giving the last alone their attention and thought. We shall then get a complete scheme of life and its philosophy, in which no important human value would unduly be either under-emphasized or over-emphasized.



INDIA'S CULTURE AND HER PROBLEMS

LECTURE IV

Our Present Problems

To the problems we have inherited from the beginning of our culture are now added problems that arose as a result of conflict with the Islamic culture and contact with the West. The contact with Islam was a real conflict, because it was violent, not peaceful. The fight was carried on with the sword and not with the intellect; but with Christianity, it was rational, social and psychological, not with blood and sword. Christianity therefore had a purifying influence on the Hindu society, while Islam made Hinduism close its social ranks, stiffen its caste system and adopt an artificial particularism or determinateness with which it sought to oppose the particularism of Islam. But the particularism of Islam belongs to its essence, it is its dogma and creed; but with Hinduism, it is artificial, evasive, lacks definition, and failed at critical moments. Christianity too is a particularist religion; but the methods it adopted in India for propagating its creed made all the difference for the Hindu between Christianity and Islam.

We may remind ourselves here of the true sense in which a religion is particularist or universal. A religion may be universal either physically or psychologically and rationally. In the former sense, every proselytizing religion would be a universal religion. Christianity preaches that if one is baptized, adopts the Christian social code, and believes that faith in Christ alone brings salvation, one is spiritually safe and admits one into its community. The teaching of Islam also is similar and it demands similar faith in Mohemmad. Both claim to be universal for the reason that they admit everybody into their communal fold on the above terms. For the same reason they are intolerant of other religions and carry wars in the name of religion. Again, for the same reason, judged psychologically and rationally, they are particularist and not universal. Real universality is rational and psychological,

not physical, and lies in the recognition that spirituality is found universally in every man and that it can be realized by him irrespective of his faith in Christ or Mohammad. To which community he belongs is only a question about his community and not about his spirituality. It is a plain fact that a psychologically universal religion can accommodate a psychologically particularist religion, because the latter would be one of the so many units that can come under the universal; but a psychologically particularist religion cannot accommodate a psychologically universal religion, because, if it does so, it loses its own particularity and would be absorbed.

Though Indian culture was rationally and psychologically universal, and, on the social side, attained a unity through the very same universality, for the same reason the social unity it attained was loose-knit. Its very spirit of tolerance was its weakness, because the integration of groups brought together was not strong enough for concerted effective action in face of rival cultural onslaughts. In other words, our social unity or solidarity was not dynamic, but weak and static. The Muslims first came to convert and rule; and most of the converts at first became members of the ruling and fighting class. But later as their numbers swelled, and particularly after the advent of the British, they also had to take to productive professions and civil life and thus created complication in the traditional principle of division of professions. Hindu society was a cultural unity, not political; but the Muslim society was both a cultural and political unity, though this ideal was not often achieved by the Muslims, in spite of being appealed to in times of crisis. To the Hindu ideal of the separation of spiritual and secular headship Islam presented in opposition their unification. And to the Hindu heroic ideal of war and conquest for heroic recognition, Islam presented in contrast the communal ideal of conversion and extermination of unbelievers. Again, in contrast to the Hindu spiritual ideal of fine arts and literature, Islam presented the secular ideal of pleasure and pastime. The ideal of the economic

prosperity of the people in general was subservient to the spiritual ideal in Hindu culture and to the communal ideal in Muslim culture.

It was the British and other European nations who came to India for trade that brought the economic ideal to the forefront; or rather super-imposed it on the two earlier ideals, which had not died out. Neither the Hindu nor the Muslim society recognized the rights of the individual apart from his caste or community, that is, the individual's social action was primarily dictated by his caste if he was a Hindu and by his community if he was a Muslim. But contact with western scientific, social and political thought made the individual self-conscious; and the idea of human rights apart from caste and communal rights entered the minds of the Indians. The result was not really due to Christianity, as it is sometimes claimed; or rather it was due to Christianity only so far as the observation of different social codes, aided by the scientific, social and political education received in Christian educational institutions, made one reflect and arrive at rational conclusions. But the change was really due to the rational arguments which the missionaries advanced against wrong practices. And if reason is the standard, why accept Christianity and not reason itself? And this liberation of the individual from tradition is much more noticeable in the Hindu society than in the Muslim; because the Hindu culture is rationally and psychologically universal and so plastic, while the Muslim culture is particularist and determinate and so rigid and unreceptive, though it is otherwise with a minority of educated Muslims.

The words universal and particularist are not used in order to extol or deprecate any religion: they are mere descriptive terms. When Hinduism, Islam or Christianity is analysed, it is not the intention of the speaker to speak ill or well of that religion. When we have some problems to solve, we have to understand clearly the causes that gave rise to those problems. An objective attitude to facts is all that is adopted here. During those days

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their repercussions on those in the others, and all have importance for the day to day life of the Indian. While in the early period of cultural formation, the problems existed due to friction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, colour and colour, caste and caste, the problems towards the end of the period were not so serious as to cause the shedding of blood, though in the early period of the contact of the Aryans with the pre-Aryan settlers, the conflict between colour and colour might have been bloody as it was due to desire for conquest. But those conflicts were almost forgotten by the time the different groups settled down as castes and sub-castes of the same social structure. Later wars were wars of a definitely conceived heroic age. Foreign invasions were not of cultural importance. Indian culture was neither affected by them nor influenced their outcome very much. But the invasions after the advent of Islam assumed a different aspect. The social side of the pre-existent Indian culture betrayed its weakness, and the outcome was unfavourable to it. It then tried to apply its rational and psychological universality by introducing a few social reforms; but such universality was rejected by Islam, which did not wish to lose its definite particularity and itself in the outcome. For instance, though Sikhism attempted a reconciliation, it was cruelly persecuted by Aurangzeb. Had Sikhism been recognized by the Muslims as representing the essential truths of both Islam and Hinduism, Islam as such would have disappeared from India. For no particularist religion can justify its existence, if its particularity is rationalized and turned into a universal. Had not the Vaiseshikas enunciated this as a logical principle? However, Islam not only added its own community but also created new reform groups, for which Indian society had to find place. Ancient Indian culture was a culture containing many sub-cultures. The new additions destroyed its original integral form, however, ill-defined it was.

Contact with western culture and Christianity has not only added new groups but also tended to produce a new rationalized integration, which is politically and economically free from a theological bias and is therefore secular in outlook. But this

when the Hindu-Muslim unity was supposed to be an accomplished fact in India, some one wrote that Aurangzeb treated the Hindus better than he did the Muslims. A reviewer observed that it would have been better and safer to depict facts as they were in history if we are to face the problems and solve them than to falsify history itself. It is always dangerous to falsify facts and imagine that there are no problems. It would be wishful thinking, if not self-deception. It may be that in the near or distant future all institutionalized religions would disappear, all religions would be rationalized and all cultures would be made spiritual, when we shall be neither proud of Hinduism, Islam or Christianity nor apologetic for any. But when we have to face our present cultural problems, we have to know the facts as they are and describe them as they are. And these problems are presented now to all cultural groups that live in India, including the Muslim and the Hindu.

There would have been no cultural problems for India, had one culture supplanted another from the beginning. Instead, one was super-imposed on another. And further, the culture of India does not merely consist of layer upon layer: the layers penetrate each other in some places; and Indian culture as a whole therefore presents both contrasts and complexities, contrasts because the layers are still discernible and complexities because they penetrate each other. For instance, Sikhism created a complexity by refusing to be a part of Islam and yet endeavouring to maintain some distinctness from Hinduism. The Brahmoism tended to do so at one time, but later acknowledged its being a part of Hinduism. The educated modern Hindu, who shows a great amount of reformist zeal, has given up a number of traditional practices, and the question is asked: Is he a Hindu or not? India is often called a land of contrasts; and we find contrasts in all spheres of culture, social, political, religious and philosophical, though after the division of India into Pakistan and India, attempts at uniformity in the political sphere are being made in India by turning the old semi-independent states into self-governing parts of the whole. However, the problems in each sphere have

- (3) *Intensity and depth are sought after by the Hindu culture and mere width and shallowness are shunned. Depth gives inwardness to culture and meaning to life, which otherwise would be mad and aimless activity.*
- (4) The universality and rationality, lying at the basis of Indian culture, have enabled Buddhism to proclaim that *Dharma (law) is natural and so is not an artefact*. The Law of Life is the Law of Nature as well and it should be the ideal of life. The advantage in adopting this attitude is that the spiritual and the ethical could thereby be liberated from historical entanglements, dogmas and other irrational factors, and made natural. But in practice both Hinduism and Buddhism confined this law to the realm of the spiritual alone and accepted current external codes with little criticism. However, the practice led to their tolerance, because the spiritual law only was to be universal according to them, and the ethical could be relative and so different in different social groups.
- (5) *All the other values are subordinated by Hinduism to the spiritual. The economic (artha), the emotional (kama), and the ethical (dharma) are made subservient to the spiritual (moksha). The attention of the systematic philosophers was given to the last and not to the other three. Or to be more exact, the concepts pertaining to the other values are not as systematically developed as the concepts pertaining to moksha. The classical philosophers gave little thought to the former. Only Mimamsa or the Dharmasutras of Jaimini may be pointed to as an exception. But it stopped short of developing into a philosophical system of social ethics; and the Dharmashastras remained at the level of ethical codes and did not become ethical philosophies. The other*

secular form is less eagerly welcomed by the Muslims than by the Hindus. So secularization has failed in part and Pakistan come into existence. But India's problem is not solved, because she is not a Hindu state and has millions of Muslims. Then how are the social groups in India to be integrated now, so that she can react as a unit to groups outside India? The political unity and strength of a country depend on its having a healthy social unity as well. To these problems are again added the problems created by the division into economic classes, a division which cuts across the traditional divisions. The economic age that was being slowly ushered into the world was given a definite conceptual form by Marx, who worked out its basic ideas systematically in all their cultural aspects, however one-sided his attempt may be. And these ideas, as in every other part of the world, have become part of the leaven of our present cultural ferment.

We may now summarize the problems and attempt tentative answers. The following main traits of our culture, which have human and social importance, may be noted:--

- (1) *The foundations of ancient Indian religion, that is, of Hinduism, are natural, rational and psychological. The emphasis as a consequence is laid on spirituality, which is psychological and inward, and not upon sets of dogmas or creeds.*
- (2) *For laying the emphasis on the spiritual factor of religion, which is common to all men, Hinduism is truly universal. Or if we wish to express the same in other words, the universality of Hinduism is philosophical and psychological, but not physical. Buddhism retained this pure spirituality much more conspicuously, by having little to do with the social and political forms of the countries to which it spread. Hinduism, though it did not spread outside India as much as Buddhism, did the same with regard to the different social groups that entered its fold.*

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generalized this principle of right to life and made it applicable to all moving creatures ; so much so that a vegetarian is now more respected by society than a non-vegetarian ; and the Hindu mind has become very sensitive to the shedding of blood. The recognition of the right to life in every living creature and particularly in every human being has become part of the nature of almost every Hindu.

(9) *Hindu religion, like many other religions, recognizes the spiritual equality of all men.* That all men should be socially and economically equal has not been so well visualized. Here it is consistent with its ideal of the essentially rational and psychological spirituality of all religions and the essential spirituality of all men.

(10) *The enjoyment of santi (peace), srīngara (love), and karuṇa (compassion) is the highest ideal placed before us by the Hindu culture as a whole.* We may remind ourselves that *santi* is not the peace of emptiness, nor is *srīngara* the love of the flesh. According to Bharata, all emotions issue from the original emotion *santi* ; according to Bhoja, *srīngara* is the matrix of all emotions and is of the nature of the Self ; and in Uṣavabhūti's contention that *karuṇa* is the source of all other emotions, scholars see the Buddhist ideal. They are ideals to be psychologically realized ; and they influence man's activity in all spheres.

(11) *The Hindu cultural outlook developed a peculiar insularity, which became all the more patent in its later forms.* There was a sense of self-sufficiency and self-completeness, a feeling that nothing could be imported from outside and incorporated, which finally resulted in a kind of inexpressiveness in social and political spheres. At one time Hinduism spread outside the seas ; but later to cross the seas became unwelcome. Similarly, at one time new groups were

schools just accepted the ethical codes and did not care to develop the philosophical principles underlying them. *And this practice encouraged the separation of spiritual values from the more tangibly human.*

- (6) Because of the separation of the spiritual factor of religion from the social and other entanglements, which are explicitly recognized to be incidental and not essential, *Hinduism became deliberately tolerant and is proverbially so.* It would look even upon the dogmas of other religions as excusable externals, so long as they do not interfere with itself.
- (7) *Compassion (karuna) and spiritual uplift of those who are spiritually low are the contribution of Buddhism to the message which Indian culture gives.*
- (8) *The recognition of the right to life, not only of every human being but also of every living being is the contribution of both Buddhism and Jainism to the Hindu outlook.* Ahimsa, which is common to all Indian-born religions, has received a particularly strong emphasis from Jainism. It is important to note the social and humanistic significance of this principle. According to tribal morality, members of other tribes have no right to life, except by convention or treaty. According to communal religions, the members of other religions have no right to life just by being men; their right to life is a concession of mercy, not a natural right. Some of the white races treated the coloured races in the same way, as for instance the Spaniards the inhabitants of South America. Putting a Negro in the zoo in Germany during Hitler's time is another example. But the early Aryans in India did not treat the original settlers in the same way, but respected their right to life by permitting them to live in separate groups as *varnas* and *sub castes.* Jainism, in its creed of *ahimsa*,

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admitted as proselytes ; but later proselytization was forbidden. The same sense of self-sufficiency might have been responsible for the non-importation of the Confucian humanistic outlook from China in return for giving her the Buddhist way of life.

- (12) Because the spiritual principle of religion was viewed as distinct from the social and political forms, *not only was the spiritual head separated from the political head, but also was each social group allowed to have its own kind of social forms.* For instance, the marital forms of the different castes are different ; and among tribes of remote hill districts, marriage by capture is still common. Yet all are Hindus. That is, there is no homogeneity of social forms. The feeling of social affinity is therefore not so strong in the Hindu society as in the Muslim. In this respect, the Muslim culture takes quite an opposite attitude not only by identifying the spiritual and secular headship but also by not permitting the groups that enter its fold to have their own ways of social life.
- (13) Cultural unity is nowhere the same as political unity. *The Hindu was not accustomed to think of wars between kingdoms as wars between communities.* He would therefore regard cultural unity as not essential for political unity. But the Muslim thinks along quite opposite lines.
- (14) According to his religion, the Muslim would not serve a non-Muslim monarch so far as possible ; but the Hindu does not mind being the subject of a non-Hindu state. This attitude also helped cohesion of the Muslims
- (15) *The Hindu culture is essentially plastic.* It is theologically and psychologically indeterminate and so can take any number of new determinations or forms with-

out being destroyed in the process. We may introduce any number of social reforms and any number of novelties in cult and worship; yet it remains Hindu. It is expansive and progressive in this respect. It has been its weakness so far, because in conflict with Islam, which stubbornly kept to its original determinate forms, it lacked that force and vigour which only a determinate form can have; but in view of the spreading rationalism and of new social and political forms, this weakness can be turned into our strength, if properly utilized and guided.

- (16) *This plastic indeterminacy of Hindu culture prevented it, in face of rival cultures, from having a definite creed and programme, so far as its social side was concerned. If the new social group was willing to settle down as a new caste or sub-caste, Hinduism could find a place for it. But when it refused to do so, Hinduism did not know what to do, as it had nothing concrete and tangible to which it could compel the new group to submit. It would tolerate the new group; but if the new group was intolerant, the Hindu society could fight only to make it tolerant and for nothing more. But there was nothing in Hinduism to make the new group incapable of interfering even in the future. So Hinduism, by its very nature, was made to fight only in defense. And no culture can live, if it is to fight for ever in defense. Life is progressive or regressive; it is never static.*
- (17) *The second most important social group in India is the Muslim community and represents many cultural factors that are opposed to those represented by the Hindu community. Islam recognizes no caste and race differences. But in that non-recognition itself it involved the spirit of intolerance of differences and so of other cultures. But while caste differences*

admitted as proselytes ; but later proselytization was forbidden. The same sense of self-sufficiency might have been responsible for the non-importation of the Confucian humanistic outlook from China in return for giving her the Buddhist way of life.

- (12) Because the spiritual principle of religion was viewed as distinct from the social and political forms, *not only was the spiritual head separated from the political head, but also was each social group allowed to have its own kind of social forms.* For instance, the marital forms of the different castes are different ; and among tribes of remote hill districts, marriage by capture is still common. Yet all are Hindus. That is, there is no homogeneity of social forms. The feeling of social affinity is therefore not so strong in the Hindu society as in the Muslim. In this respect, the Muslim culture takes quite an opposite attitude not only by identifying the spiritual and secular headship but also by not permitting the groups that enter its fold to have their own ways of social life.
- (13) Cultural unity is nowhere the same as political unity. *The Hindu was not accustomed to think of wars between kingdoms as wars between communities.* He would therefore regard cultural unity as not essential for political unity. But the Muslim thinks along quite opposite lines.
- (14) *According to his religion, the Muslim would not serve a non-Muslim monarch so far as possible ; but the Hindu does not mind being the subject of a non-Hindu state.* This attitude also helped cohesion of the Muslims
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are an evil, intolerance is a greater evil. While Hinduism separates spiritual and secular headship, Islam identifies them, and the Muslim would rather live in a Muslim state than in a non-Muslim one. Again, while Islam permits its spiritual head to be the secular head and possess worldly luxuries, it treats fine arts as profane and unspiritual; but Hinduism adopts quite the opposite attitude. In origin, while Islam is tribal, Hinduism is natural and psychological and so does not possess that social, communal and worldly interest which Islam shows. And further, Islam adds more and more members to its fold through conversion and is happy to increase its numbers but Hinduism adopts an attitude of superiority and does not wish to take any converts, though resenting any loss of its own members to other religions. Contemporary Indian culture on the whole contains these conflicting forms and attitudes, which, unless rationally approached and reconciled, would be a potential danger to our social life and culture.

Culture is essentially mental. But inward or outward, it has its repercussions on the individual and society and affects their welfare in all spheres. It determines indirectly the individual's ways of thinking and acting and, through the individuals, the ways of society. There are people who say that Hindu culture is spiritual, that spirituality is not affected by social strength or weakness and that those who attribute India's weakness to her one-sided spirituality are confusing the issues. It may be conceded that though a man is physically very weak, he may be spiritually very great, this point is not contested. But the spiritual cannot live in abstraction; it wants a body. This body has to be maintained by society; and so society has to exist. If it is to exist, it has to defend itself from attacks, whatever be their form, by other societies; and so it has to be strong. But society cannot be strong, if the individual is not healthy and strong. So in order to be spiritually great, both society and the

individual have to be physically healthy and strong. Again, society has to be healthy and strong internally; that is, the structure of society should be healthy and balanced, capable of integrated and unitary action, without one part pulling one way and the other in the opposite. Society has to be strong externally also, that is, in its relations to other societies. Just as the physiological structure of the individual's body should be healthy and his actions with reference to other individuals should not be suicidal; the structure of society should be healthy and its relations to other societies should not be suicidal. No individual or society can live long simply through the mercy of others; its existence would be precarious and may not be even worth having. This is bare logic of facts; and no sentiment about our past spiritual glories should be allowed to confuse the issues, though such confusion is likely to be encouraged from outside by interested people and from inside by people who are unable to apprehend clearly the context in which we are living. Culture does not belong merely to the realm of imagination; it belongs to the realm of life, which thinks, feels and acts in the physical world. Cultural ideals influence our thoughts, feelings and actions.

Some say that our highly spiritual culture is a product of our peculiar political, social and geographical conditions. But others like Dr. Schweitzer say that, though such interpretation holds true of Greek Stoicism and Epicurianism, it does not hold true of Indian thought. In the speaker's opinion, Dr. Schweitzer is right. For Indian Philosophy reached its heights when the Aryans were at the zenith of their power; and cognate thoughts developed in other countries in different political and geographical conditions. And whatever be the factors that produced our culture, when once it acquired definite shape, it began to influence our thought and action. It is said that one of the descendants of Ashoka proclaimed that Dharma would conquer the enemy, even when he was actually invading his kingdom. He hypostatized the abstract principle of Dharma and expected the abstraction to fight the concrete enemy. But Dharma never fights by itself, but through

its physical embodiment. And if its physical embodiment is not strong, it would be defeated. One may say that Dharma is never defeated: yes, as an abstract principle it is never defeated and the world does not want that it should ever be defeated; but as embodied, it is defeated whenever its embodiment is not strong and healthy. It is therefore necessary that the physical embodiment should be strong and healthy; and Dharma should be such as to be capable of taking on a strong embodiment. Dharma should not expect to live on earth, if its embodiment cannot be strong and healthy.

The speaker speaks as a philosopher and not as a practical politician; but he speaks as a philosopher who is aware of the significance of philosophy for life and of thought for action. The problems that Indian culture has to face now are many and we find them complicated when we try to work out their solution.

(1) The first set of problems are those given rise to by the peculiar universality of the Hindu culture. We have observed many times that it is rational and psychological and not social and physical. In cementing several groups, it is the common universal element that becomes the principle of unity; and this principle does not possess, socially and physically, enough concreteness in Hinduism. That is why our social unity has not been tangible and effective, that is, it has not been dynamic.

It is not questioned whether rational and psychological universality is not good and great in itself. It has already been said that true universality is rational and psychological. To universalize is to generalize and rationalize. But the question is about its usefulness to us in the particular social and political circumstances in which we are living. A purely spiritual universal succeeds only in producing a spiritual unity, when applied as a principle of unification. And the social unity it produces may be loose, indifferent and intangible. For instance, Buddhism spread over almost the whole of Asia, and we may say that it unified many lands spiritually for a long time. But it did not attempt to produce a political unity; and it did not succeed in

producing a social unity even, not even that much which Christianity produced. The Christian nations show concern whenever a non-Christian nation invades a Christian country, however much they may quarrel among themselves. Such concern is shown by Muslim nations also. But we have not heard so far of a similar concern among Buddhist nations. The principle of the liberation of the spiritual from the social and political, which Hinduism attempted, was carried to the extreme by Buddhism. Unlike Christianity Buddhism did not carry with it a code of even social ethics, nothing to speak of a code for political action. The Tibetan theocracy is an accident and does not belong to the substance of Buddhism.

The principle of spiritual unity is realizable, as most people say, only by philosophers and saints. The common man wants something more tangible for social unity. The Hindus have many social and religious practices in common. But in face of a common rival, history has shown, they are not effective enough. We have therefore to conclude that the differences that divide the social groups should be much less than they are in order to make the common points effective. If we take the army as an example for effective group organization, we may see the importance of flags, uniforms etc., which are tangible signs of that unity. That is, any principle of social unity, in order to be effective, must be socially tangible and concrete.

For instance, forms of marriage did not unite the Hindu society, because each caste had its own forms: similarly, neither dress nor food was common. I am not referring merely to inter-marriages and inter-dining; I am referring to the ceremonial forms. Here is the social advantage of those religions that identified themselves with a particular set of concrete social laws. We may give this process, the common name *social standardization*, which produces effective unity and integration. Indeed, this social standardization was accomplished by Islam in the name of religion. And as it was not based upon rational, scientific principles, we call it *communalism*. And this standard-

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aim of social integration. We want that it should be healthy and strong; and for that purpose we want it to be rational and scientific. We do not want desocialization of the individual. When the moorings of an individual, however undesirable they may be, are cut off from a particular society, we have to supply him moorings to some other society. For man is essentially social.

(2) As a consequence of the liberation of the spiritual from social and political entanglements, we have become proverbially tolerant. But our tolerance itself has set new problems for us. We speak about the greatness of tolerance, but forget about the causes that produced it and the problems raised by those causes. We are very sentimental about the principle of tolerance and have become therefore psychologically blind to its problems. Tolerance is undoubtedly noble; but it has differing importance in different circumstances. If for instance two tolerant cultures or religions come into contact, the result would be peaceful and each would be benefited by the other. But if one of them is tolerant and the other intolerant, what would be the result? Paul Dhakke asserts that it is the peculiar nature of the Semitic religions to be intolerant, though he does not give reasons for their intolerance. Islam has been all along intolerant, be the explanation cultural or economic backwardness; and intolerance seems to be part of its dogma and creed, if we understand it in the light of the happenings immediately before the partition. The leadership of the communal riots is attributed to educated Muslims, and sincere nationalist Muslims with advanced and progressive views were assaulted by fanatical members of their own community¹. Investigations into the causes of the riots disclose that they were not due to economic reasons. These facts should not be undervalued though both the Muslims and other communities should co-operate with each other in solving the problems after understanding the causes aright.

1. Mahatma Gandhi was assaulted by a Hindu, not for preaching tolerance, but for being mistaken for encouraging Muslim aggressiveness and preventing the non-Muslims from acting in defense.

ization was the most effectively done by Islam, because it not only removed colour and race distinctions within its community, but also fairly successfully identified its temporal and spiritual headship,—neither of which was achieved by Christianity,—and so far as possible liquidated all dissident elements. This standardization, which is the chief characteristic of modern political totalitarianism, covered all aspects of cultural life in Islamic society. Buddhism affords the opposite example. It never deliberately attempted such standardization. Islam and Buddhism thus belong to the opposite poles of this cultural process.

Should we then attempt such standardization on religious principles? First, it is too late to make the attempt. Secondly, we can go only forward, but not backward. We cannot go back to the Vedic times and change the Vedic conceptions. They were formed more than three thousand years ago, and it is impossible for us to go back to those times and relive history in a different form, so that we can now have a different type of social traditions. In the third place, both our achievements and failures are due to those conceptions, which were certainly the best under those conditions. And we have to retain our achievements, though forestall and prevent further failures. The unifying principle of our spiritual culture was rational and psychological; then why not again follow a rational and psychological principle for a closer integration of our society? We are living in a scientific age; and so our social standardization should be based upon scientific social principles. The citizens of India now belong to almost all important religions of the world. We should not impose the communal principles of some of them on the rest. The principle should be derived from a study of the nature of man and society. It is the same rational and scientific spirit that is behind India's becoming a secular state. Our first concern would then be the discovery of a rational and scientific principle for social integration. Our next concern should then be that the principle derived from this spirit should not deracialize the social individual; for it would then defeat our

'intolerant'. Without establishing to some degree the principle of tolerance, of equality of rights, in every culture, the 'intolerant' culture will always be endangering a democratic world organization. Intolerance against intolerant cultures is therefore a prerequisite to any organization of permanent peace¹.

But now in the name of what are we to be intolerant? To be intolerant in the name of tolerance is an amorphous ideal, which history has shown to be ineffectual. Even if the intolerance of a particular group is once checked, there is nothing to prevent it from being intolerant again if an opportunity is found. So the principle that is to be imposed on the intolerant group for acceptance should be one derived from the reason behind the tolerance to be preached. It should not be an irrational dogma, but a rational principle obtained from a scientific study of man and society and not from communal codes and theological speculations. It would therefore be secular. The intolerant group should adopt it in the interests of true and positive tolerance. The intolerance of the intolerant cannot be shown in the name of this or that community, but in the name of man and society. Such practice would be truly humanistic. For instance, any law that is to be passed should not aim at the reform of this or that community but should be imposed on all communities if the motive behind the enactment is the interest of man and society. The wording itself has to be carefully chosen with this aim.

(3) The next problem would be: How are we to obtain the psychological and social motive power for the above ideal? The state may have police and military for enforcing this ideal. But only when that force represents the will of the people can it work effectively. This is a problem for the educational policy of the state. Any ideal, in order to be effective, should become part of the nature of the people. Virtue, said Aristotle, is a habit. The effectiveness of an ideal is proportional to the

1. *Resolving Cultural Conflicts*, p. 36.

Hinduism admitted several social groups into its fold, allowed them to have their own ways of social life, reinterpreting them in terms of rational and spiritual ideas. It would gladly have done the same to the Islamic group also, and would not have even forced it to accept the sacerdotal superiority of the Brahmin caste, as it did to some groups like the Buddhist and the Jaina, who did not accept the authority of the Vedas. It does not sound reasonable to say that, had the Muslims agreed to live like the Buddhists and the Jainas as part of the Indian society, they would have been given an inferior social status. No Buddhist or Jaina accepts a social status inferior to that of the Hindu, just because he does not recognize caste distinctions; nor is the Christian now doing so. Each group thinks that it is superior to the others and might be allowed to do so, so long as that attitude does not lead to physical conflicts, though when it develops beyond certain limits, it would affect social integration. However, Islam refused to be a group within the Indian society. Islam would admit the Hindus, as it admits other non-Islamic groups, provided they give up every basic principle of their culture; but Hinduism would admit Islam into its fold, even though it does not give up any element of its culture except its creed of destroying non-Islamic cultures. Naturally the conflict was disadvantageous to the Hindu society and advantageous to the Islamic. This result was due to the Hindu principle of tolerance, which is not active tolerance. Hinduism had nothing to gain for its society by defeating Islam. That is, Hindu tolerance is not an active principle and is without a definite creed, whereas Islamic intolerance is an active principle and its negative part of the destruction of other cultures is meant for the positive part of spreading and strengthening its own culture.

Speaking of the Fascist cultures, Kurt Lewin writes "A democratic world order does not require or even favour cultural uniformity all over the world. The parallel for democratic freedom for the individual is cultural pluralism for groups. But any democratic society has to safeguard against the misuse of individual freedom by the gangster or —politically speaking— the

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degree to which it has become innate to man. The action of both the individual and society is hampered, if they are to frame for themselves a problem at each situation and discover a solution which would accord with that ideal. Taking education in the wider sense of imparting knowledge and developing character in order to make the individual a useful member of society, the ideal should be inculcated right from the childhood of the citizen. Kurt Lewin again writes: "A pattern like democracy is not limited to political problems but is interwoven with every aspect of the culture. How the mother handles her child of one, two, or three years of age; how business is conducted; what group has status, how status differences are reacted to—all these habitudes are essential elements of the cultural pattern. Every major change, therefore, has to be carried through against such a highly interwoven background. It cannot be limited to a change in officially recognized values; it has to be a change in actual life."²⁰ This is not a new but a very important truth. If we have a secular, rational and scientific ideal in politics, it has got to be supported by our social structure, our social reactions, and the relations of individuals to each other. If it is really what suits our society,—we have observed that it does,—it should be enforced and worked out in all its details. If the member of a theocratic state fights and is prepared to give up his life for the theocratic ideal, the member of a secular state should fight equally fanatically for the secular ideal, whether he traces his descent to a Muslim, Hindu or Christian parentage. His character should be built up and his psychological urges should be canalized accordingly.

One important question we have to put to ourselves now is: Does this new ideal accord with our deeper cultural characteristics? Lewin writes: "The fact that superficial although violent cultural sentiments might change quickly in a nation does not, however, disprove those historians who claim that nothing can be changed so little as the deeper cultural characteristics of a people. It is these deeper cultural traits that we have

■ consider when thinking of the cultural aspects of permanent peace. In Germany, in spite of the pacifist sentiment after the First World War and long before Hitler, every child was again playing war with toy soldiers. And soon in line with the long-standing tradition, militarists were again winning out. On the other hand, Mussolini has tried for more than a decade to build up in the Italians those soldierly characteristics which were obviously lacking in the First World War. In spite of a very thorough attempt which reached every age level down to early childhood he seems to have failed to alter these cultural characteristics".⁶¹ There was too great disparity between the deep-lying traits of the Italian national character and the ideals placed before the Italians by Mussolini. The result was disaster. We have to ask ourselves therefore the question whether we can work out the secular ideal in all spheres of life and achieve the required social solidarity. If the ideal is rational and scientific, based upon a careful study of human nature, we should be successful in working it out.

The secular ideal not only cuts across the different communal ideologies, but also suits the Hindu character. It is not anti-religious, though secular; and so it is not anti-spiritual. We have observed that the basis of Hindu culture is indeterminate, plastic and spiritual. Because it is plastic, it can take any form and yet be Hindu. There are now few Christian theocratic states, and Christians are accustomed to secular political life. And because of the great advance of science, technology, and industrialization in Christian countries, its people are accustomed to think in terms of reason and science, except perhaps on a few Sundays. So the new ideal will suit them also. But will it be acceptable to the Muslims as well, who now form an important part of the Indian society? Everything depends on how the Muslims react to this ideal and on how willing they are to work it out. We have been talking for long of religious education: but in practice it turned out to be communal education and indoctrination in certain sections. Then we thought of moral

degree to which it has become innate to man. The action of both the individual and society is hampered, if they are to frame for themselves a problem at each situation and discover a solution which would accord with that ideal. Taking education in the wider sense of imparting knowledge and developing character in order to make the individual a useful member of society, the ideal should be inculcated right from the childhood of the citizen. Kurt Lewin again writes: "A pattern like democracy is not limited to political problems but is interwoven with every aspect of the culture. How the mother handles her child of one, two, or three years of age; how business is conducted; what group has status, how status differences are reacted to—all these habitudes are essential elements of the cultural pattern. Every major change, therefore, has to be carried through against such a highly interwoven background. It cannot be limited to a change in officially recognized values; it has to be a change in actual life."⁴⁰ This is not a new but a very important truth. If we have a secular, rational and scientific ideal in politics, it has got to be supported by our social structure, our social reactions, and the relations of individuals to each other. If it is really what suits our society,—we have observed that it does,—it should be enforced and worked out in all its details. If the member of a theocratic state fights and is prepared to give up his life for the theocratic ideal, the member of a secular state should fight equally fanatically for the secular ideal, whether he traces his descent to a Muslim, Hindu or Christian parentage. His character should be built up and his psychological urges should be canalized accordingly.

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It is a great experiment that India is making. We are by nature too idealistic and are often even ashamed of facing realities, so much so that sometimes we not only wish that they had not existed but also act as if they did not. There is perhaps some truth in the remark that the Indians have no historical sense. It is not enough ■ say that we produced great professors of history. Our actions must show that we take history to be true. Take for instance the number of moral, social and political programmes we have announced and with reference to which we shall be judged. None would say that those programmes are wrong; they are noble and useful. But Pakistan has shown a more realistic and historical sense. She knows her weakness and her strength and uses no tone of unnecessary moral edification. It is often safe to be realistic in our programmes. The difference between ideals and practice should not be allowed to look like opposition and contrast. Our idealism should not blind us ■ realities and the problems they raise.

For instance, Pakistan would say that her people chose the traditional Islamic ideal. She shows no self-reformist zeal and does not claim to impose anything new on her people. She is therefore safe in the eyes of the world. But the strength of India lies in the success with which she imposes her new ideal on herself, that is, on how far she succeeds in making her people, irrespective of caste, creed and race, accept the secular ideal, and fight for it if necessary. She should be able to obtain recognition for the strength of her ideal, both internally and externally. Her future depends on the degree of her success in achieving this goal. And her success depends upon the amount of co-operation she receives from the Muslims of India, who should be prepared to eschew such aspects of their culture as conflict with the secular political ideal and with the ideals of non-Muslim communities. That is, self criticism by the Muslims is as great a need as self criticism by other communities. Reason should be their common platform, but not irrationality, however authoritative.

Another programme that shows lack of appreciation of the historical and which is not so much sponsored by the Congress ■

education; but the teachers of morality had themselves to be examples of moral perfection. And further, what moral code are we to teach? Is it to be with the Islamic communal background, with the Christian communal background or with the Hindu communal background, each with its hatred of others and contempt for them? It would have been better had we thought of producing true civic sense in the child and severely punishing any teaching of communal hatred.

This new secular character-building and civic sense should therefore be an ideal in all educational institutions. But will the Muslims say that the enforcement of that ideal amounts to endangering their religion? And if they say so, what is the state to do? When Mr. Prakasam, as the premier, announced in Madras that every individual was to get five yards of rationed cloth, the Muslims objected saying that it was against their religion, according to which every Muslim woman was to wear seven yards of cloth. Here is a case in which religion was made to conflict with civic responsibility. It was said that a concession was made to the Muslim community. Supposing some Muslim theocratic state feels concerned about the secularization of Muslim education, what would the state do? The former state may say that such secularization is cultural genocide. In such circumstances, it is the co-operation of the Muslims of India that can solve the problem. They should be prepared to set aside their theocratic leanings. If otherwise the state makes concessions, its secularization would become half-hearted and weak; and its unity would be affected. There would be disparity between its ideals and practice. If practice does not support its ideals in one sphere, it will begin to withdraw its support in the other spheres as well. The result would be that the social structure of this country does not conform to its political ideal and our society cannot react as a unit to impacts from outside. The strength of India depends on how effectively and thoroughly the secular civic ideal is worked into the character of every one of its citizens.

It is a great experiment that India is making. We are by nature too idealistic and are often even ashamed of facing realities, so much so that sometimes we not only wish that they had not existed but also act as if they did not. There is perhaps some truth in the remark that the Indians have no historical sense. It is not enough to say that we produced great professors of history. Our actions must show that we take history to be true. Take for instance the number of moral, social and political programmes we have announced and with reference to which we shall be judged. None would say that those programmes are wrong, they are noble and useful. But Pakistan has shown a more realistic and historical sense. She knows her weakness and her strength and uses no tone of unnecessary moral edification. It is often safe to be realistic in our programmes. The difference between ideals and practice should not be allowed to look like opposition and contrast. Our idealism should not blind us to realities and the problems they raise.

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formity or homogeneity in the same group is not only desirable but also possible. We shall then have enough social unity to oppose any attempt at disintegration from outside, which yet would not lose its spiritual identity because of the plastic spiritual basis.

(5) The imposition of cultural uniformity is not the same as the destruction of the differing cultures that together constitute what is now Indian culture. The ancient Indian method of social unification was to permit the social units that constituted the Hindu society to develop each in its own way and to have each its own way of life; the only uniformity given to them was the spiritual interpretation of their practices. The method breathes of tolerance and the spirit of 'live and let live'. But the method should have aimed at not merely permitting each group to live in its own way but also at enabling each group to develop in the best way so far known. The achievement of the latter aim was not possible in the conditions obtaining then. But there was no provision to make that attempt even when the conditions changed. Had the attempt been made, it would have led inevitably to final homogeneity and social solidarity. Even now we say that all cultures should be enabled to realize all the highest values so far known to man. Supposing this aim is realized, some significant homogeneity would be inevitable in the world. The ideal of cultural diversity and plurality should not be made to imply that inferior and backward cultures should continue their traditional life. Otherwise, we shall then have a caste system on a world wide basis. If social movement from caste to caste is essential and if caste system is defective for not permitting such movement, then a similar criticism would apply to every restriction of movement from culture to culture. And movement in either case is not meaningless movement, just going to and coming back from another caste or culture for the sake of movement, but marching towards an aim that is recognized by all as the highest. This way lies cultural progress of the world.

by some communal organizations is that of uniting all Buddhist countries with India as against the Pan-Islamic movement of Pakistan. Pan Islamism is a historical fact; it appeared and worked in the form of Jihad and of the Caliphate. It is logically implied in the theocratic ideal; it is only personal and national jealousies that prevented its effective realization. But nothing corresponding to it is historically true in Hinduism and Buddhism. Hinduism never identified secular and religious leadership; and Buddhism never cared to have a particular social structure even. Therefore such a unification of India and the Buddhist countries, even if it happens, will not happen for religious reasons. For both these cultures, both in India and outside except in Tibet, religious unity was different from social or political unity.

A new genuine creative spirit is needed in social organization to support our secular political ideal which will not, however, curtail freedom for spiritual development

(4) The indeterminateness of the spiritual basis of the Hindu culture reflected itself in the indeterminateness of its social attitudes, that is, in its not imposing a particular set of social forms upon all groups. That is, for spiritual life it is a matter of indifference as to what social forms a particular group adopts. It was this indifference, which was once its greatness, that proved later to be the weakness of the Hindu culture. But this weakness can be turned into its strength and progressiveness if we make the fullest use of the spiritual indifference to social forms by imposing a uniform determinate social structure conducive to social solidarity. If our spirituality was indifferent to a plurality of sets of social forms, it will be equally indifferent to their unity. Cultural unity, uniformity or homogeneity is one of the essential conditions to social solidarity and stability. Within the same society cultural unity is preferable to cultural plurality. To speak of cultural plurality, variety, richness, colourfulness etc., in the same social group would be to ignore that such a phenomenon would weaken society by encouraging fragmentary tendencies and is not practical and realistic. And cultural uni-

(7) We have observed that cultural unity is not necessarily political unity. And in India cultural unity has not resulted in effective social solidarity even. Though cultural unity is not political unity, it should support the latter. If it contains any factors opposed to political unity, they may have to be transformed into concordant elements.

(8) Our culture is spiritual and so inward. The spiritual has been isolated from the social and so turned individualistic. It has given depth to our life, but produced a sense of insularity, self-containedness. Though our spirituality spread outside India, particularly through the efforts of Buddhism, our methods of spiritualizing different aspects of life did not spread. We gave our spiritual discoveries to others; and in the spiritual realm we had much to give and little to take. We did not care to give our social forms to others. And as others did not care to take them and we did not care to give them, we experienced no conflict; we had little opportunity therefore to reflect on them and could not realize where we were defective. The idea that there was nothing spiritually new to receive from other cultures wrongly led us to think that there was nothing socially and politically new in them which we could incorporate with advantage. We should have produced Huen Tsangs and Fahiens for studying other social and political forms. If this neglect was a mistake several centuries ago, it would be a graver mistake now in the present context. We have now to question ourselves seriously why we gave to others and did not care much to receive from them in cultural commerce.

(9) If our culture should now aim, along with other objects, at integrated social action, as no social action is possible without corresponding individual action, a psychological change has to be produced in the personality of the individual. The question is not whether the *Jhagarsadists* preached action or inaction, but whether the personality of the individual is set with the desirable aptitude for action. Our proverbial inactivity may not be true. Or it may be due to geographical and political condi-

(6) The ideal of all our fine arts, music, literature, painting, dancing etc., has been spiritual unity; and the spiritual is the same in every individual. The ideal should now be social unity as well. There is much truth in what Whitehead says, namely, that religion is what one does in his loneliness. That is, spiritual life is essentially individualistic. But social unity is of a different type. The realization of social unity is not individualistic unlike the realization of spiritual unity. The ideals of our fine arts, *santi* (peace), *srīngara* (love) and *kāruṇa* (compassion), have been psychologically individualistic, and the unities they aim at are spiritual. We have now to place before these fine arts the ideals of social unity also. Experts should of course decide how this is to be done. The Muslim culture has no problems in this connexion; because fine arts are a pastime for it and are condemned by Islam. But in the Hindu culture, they have been developed into techniques of spiritual realization, which is essentially individualistic. But now aesthetic ideals should be formulated for the sake of the realization of social unities.

Social unity is meant for internal peace and external action, whereas spiritual unity is meant for internal realization, satisfaction and contentment, and consequent inwardness. Another consequence is external inactivity, which is a result of satisfaction. Man is satisfied when the end is achieved, and there will be no action issuing from him for that end. Now *santi*, *srīngara* and *kāruṇa* are the highest emotive ideals, because spiritually they liquify our ego and make it transparent for receiving the ultimate reality. But the more the ego is liquified the less the possibility for action. But at the social level we desire possibility for integrated action. If fine arts are to lead to integrated social action, their ideals are to be discovered in our urges that result in such action. Just as the traditional techniques make us enjoy *santi*, *srīngara* and *kāruṇa*, new techniques should make us enjoy the ideals of social action. And both the ideals and their techniques should be founded on human nature, and are not to be artificially formulated and imposed.

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tions, which are of course remediable. If we wish that the individual should be active and ready for action naturally and spontaneously, we have to invent methods by which checks and inhibitions can be removed and counteracted. It is true that though the individual is ready for action, society as a unit may not be ready. But if the individual is not ready for action, society cannot be ready for it. So a transformation of the individual's personality and its attitude to life is also an important need

(10) There is then a problem for the Muslim citizens also of India. They have now become part of the Indian society, and its welfare and prosperity is as much their concern as it is the concern of the other communal groups in it. They have to orient themselves not only to the new conditions in India but also to the rapid changes the world is going through. If India is to be strong, they have to forget and give up the theocratic ideal implicit in Islam, just as the Muslims all over the world forgot about the Caliphate and gave up the idea. They should be prepared to use the rationally interpreted experience of the world as a standard for self-analysis and evaluation and in its light give up what was of incidental value in their past. Reason is common to all men; and so it is reason that can and should bring them together and unreason that separates them. And if men wish to come together, they should have the courage to accept what reason dictates. The world has now more important causes to fight for than communalism. The Indian Muslims then should recognise (a) that the identification of secular and spiritual leadership is too antiquated and is neither possible nor desirable, (b) that no longer is it possible and advisable to think of a theocratic state for themselves, (c) that the first of the primary human rights, the right to life, is directly opposed to extermination of other cultures and their followers even in the name of religion, and that humanity should give a higher place to the right to life than the right to a place in heaven, (d) that, when other communities are asked and expected to alter their traditional ways of life in view of the changed pattern of life we have to live, the

Muslims also have to do the same, so that all would ultimately have the same pattern and tradition which would be rational and scientific, (e) that still to think of crusades and jihads is to set the clock of human progress back; and (f) that it is their duty to contribute to the evolution of a new solidly unified Indian society, which will no longer retain the defects of the past.

(ii) The planning of society for integrated social action raises a humanistic problem, which is of world-wide importance. We observed that wars between Hindu and Muslim states in the past were, for the Muslims, wars between communities and, for the Hindu, wars only between the ruling and fighting classes. The Hindu civil population felt unconcerned; but for the Muslim, it was a totalitarian war between societies. Thus the Muslim society on the whole was a sort of military camp, always in readiness to give fight; the Hindu society on the whole was a civil society, given to civil pursuits, having had to organize a fighting group whenever threatened. Understanding the situation to a certain extent, Vizianagar made the experiment of a city that was almost a military camp. In the circumstances obtaining then, the experiment could not last long and failed, because the Muslims were always a fighting and moving group, living on the income of the stable established group, which was Hindu. With deeper insight into the situation, the Marathas organized moving fighting groups. The result was chaos and insecurity throughout the country, so much so that people did not know whether the invaders and plunderers were Hindu Marathas or Muslims. In the Andhra country, the destruction of temples, deformation of idols and Saivite stone bulls etc., are attributed traditionally to Maratha armies. And the priests of those temples feel puzzled when they are told that the Marathas were Hindus.

The question now would be: will not planned integration of society, even on secular lines, lead to totalitarian warfare, including deliberate destruction of civil population, which ancient traditional Hindu ideology avoided? This again is a complicated problem. If the society of one state adopts totalitarian

methods of destruction against the society of another state that does not adopt them, then the latter would undoubtedly be at a disadvantage and will be the loser. In the last war, the allies tried to avoid destruction of civil population; but finally they were forced by circumstances to give up the attempt. This is a question not merely for a situation in which theocracy and secularism are involved. The logic of the idea of democracy, in which the reigning government is supposed to represent the will of the people, when pushed along certain lines to the extreme, forces this problem on all countries of the world. Totalitarian methods need not necessarily be Fascist or Nazi; they may be theocratic also. Where political totalitarianism becomes religious also, it becomes all the more intensified and rigorous, and its methods may be more whole heartedly barbarous than those of Nazism, which was to a certain extent counter-acted by the separation of spiritual leadership. Greater danger to the peace of the world is to be expected from totalitarianism in which political and spiritual leadership are identified than from that in which they are separated. And this danger will be particularly serious for countries which are not socially and religiously Fascist. Then either these societies have to adopt corresponding social integrations to defend themselves and counter communal Fascism, or communally Fascist societies have to be obliged to give up Fascist tendencies, though called by another name. If those that suffer from the disadvantage are not to be further weakened, then those that have the advantage have to be transformed. Communalism, theocracy and Fascism are isomorphic and are opposed to true humanism, which would recognise the rights and dignity of the individual.

(12) We have observed that humanistic bias is the common factor in all contemporary ideologies, communist, socialist, and democratic, be they spiritual or materialistic. And no philosophy of life can be truly humanistic, if it ignores the economic necessities of man. Even our ancient philosophers recognized economic values and said that *artha* or wealth is one of the four values of life, though the lowest of them. But they gave little

place to it in their systematic philosophies. Any philosophy of life is a philosophy of human life, not a philosophy of the life of the Absolute or God. Economic values are as important for man and society as the other values, and lack of their realization prevents him from realizing a full life. Any social and political structure that ignores this defect, we have to say, is in need of reform. While thinking of international economic readjustment it would be a mistake not to think of economic readjustment within the nation. How this readjustment is to be effected is a question for practical politics. But the question has its cultural importance, the right to life includes the right to the basic necessities of life. Emotional, ethical and spiritual realization, except in the case of the ascetic, is bound up with economic realization. Neither our ideology nor our social structure should be such as to either prevent the realization of all values of life or ignore their realization. Then only would our culture be truly humanistic.

(13) The previous discussion might have made it obvious that every thing that is to be done is to be done in the interests of man and society. We are very proud of our great spiritual tradition in philosophy; and our pride is justified. But man is not all spirituality. Indeed, Sundays are set apart for religion, so that we may treat the rest as religious and moral holidays; yet everyday cannot be a holiday for rest and contemplation. Similarly, philosophy should aim at the clarification of concepts pertaining not merely to the spiritual uplift of man, man is to be uplifted ethically, emotionally and economically also. The values pertaining to every sphere of life are life values. Life cannot be improved in one aspect and ignored in the rest, for it is one and indivisible. Any philosophy of life would be incomplete if it makes overvalued emphasis on any one of the values. We say that a man who pursues economic values exclusively is a miser and a materialist; a man whose life's aim is nothing but emotional enjoyment is a hedonist and a sensualist; and a man whose sole aim is rigorous moral discipline a "moralist", which means that he is not

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human or humane enough. But we have the highest regard for the man who is preoccupied with the idea of salvation. From the humanistic point of view of man and society, the life of none is full. We indeed say that the saint's life is full, because his soul must be one of the oldest and must have experienced all the lower values in previous births. But his ideals cannot be placed before all, most of whose souls must be young and immature. So the philosophy meant for every soul should be a complete philosophy of life. Apart from the fact that our ancient traditional philosophies did not care to develop a philosophy of the lower values, we may point to ourselves another fact, that we have no conceptual forms in terms of which we may interpret all values of life, in order to realize that our systematic philosophies are not complete philosophies of life. For instance, we interpret and translate the word Brahman as the Absolute. But the word 'absolute' has a logical connotation and is conveniently used in that connotation by Western philosophers in their ethical, political and social philosophies also. But we cannot use the word Brahman similarly. Corresponding to 'absolutism in politics' to speak of *rajaniten brahmatvam* or *rajanitime brahmatva* would be meaningless. This is due to the fact that our philosophy, though a philosophy of life, did not cover all aspects of life's activity, and is so far incomplete. We did not develop a categorical scheme to cover all aspects of life. But no philosophy can claim to be truly humanistic, unless it covers the whole of human life. We have hence to give a humanistic bias to our philosophy. A humanistic transformation of our whole culture including our philosophy has to be consciously and carefully attempted. Other humanisms, either of the Eastern Europe or of the Western or of America, may not suit us. Humanism, whatever forms it might have taken and is taking, is the spirit of the time. And with a really critical attitude, we have to adopt the best values it has built up in other cultures and work out our own humanistic transformation. Everything depends on the degree to which our understanding of man and human values is true. Other cultures and our own ancient culture might have

laid an undue stress, which perhaps suited the time and place, on one or the other aspect of man. A critical attitude and courage of conviction should enable us to avoid the mistake and make up the short-comings¹. It may be repeated that this conscious and deliberate humanistic transformation should not be merely philosophical, but should comprehend all aspects of culture. Otherwise, again, philosophy would be divorced from life or a greater part of life.

1. Both Pandit Nehru and Dr. Radhakrishnan plead that our ancient philosophy should be brought into closer contact with the concrete problems of our mundane life.



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